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An extensive literature has analyzed the accountability of administrative
agencies, and in particular, their relationship to Congress. A well-established
strand in the literature emphasizes that Congress retains control over agencies
by their design, with a focus on the structure and process by which agency
decisionmaking is undertaken. This Article examines the relationship between
agency structure and decisionmaking across four agencies with similar statutory
missions but different organizational structures: the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB), with a uniquely independent and controversial
structure, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC), and Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), with more conventional independent commission structures. It presents
data consistent with the contention that agency structure influences agency
decisionmaking. More specifically, the statistical analysis is robustly consistent
with an agency's insulation from Congress being related to its choice of
regulatory instrument, as the most independent agency in this study, the CFPB,
uses significantly less frequently the most publicly accountable regulatory
instrument: notice-and-comment rulemaking. The Article concludes with the
analysis's implications for the CFPB's organization and more broadly for
administrative reform proposals and the agency design and administrative law
literature.
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Introduction
A core question in the study of administrative agencies is how, if at all,
organizational structure impacts agency decisionmaking. To put that broad
question into a more readily testable hypothesis, this Article addresses a specific
question: does the extent of an agency's independence from political control
affect the choice of instrument by which it regulates? The Article operationalizes
this fundamental question by a comparative analysis, examining whether the
more insulated an agency is from accountability to elected representatives, the
more frequently it will implement policy by means of an instrument that does
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not require responsiveness to public input and that is not likely to be reviewed
by courts, thereby sidestepping procedures that facilitate legislators' ability to
monitor administrative action.' Such administrative behavior can attenuate the
nexus between elected officials and administrative policymaking and could
therefore affect policy outcomes where preferences of administrators and
officeholders diverge. This issue, then, goes to the core of the administrative
state's democratic legitimacy.
The focus of the Article's research design is to identify empirically a
connection between agency structure and rulemaking by comparing the
regulatory activity of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) with
that of three other agencies with broadly similar regulatory objectives-the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The
CFPB was established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),2 Congress's response to the recent global financial
crisis, and was provided with an anomalous, politically independent structure
that has generated considerable controversy. The ongoing dispute over the
agency's structure, years after its establishment, suggests a need for examining
empirically whether the dispute over its organization is consequential and
whether the current organizational setup is for the better. The three other
agencies investigated have more conventional commission structures and
funding, which provide, in principle, for tighter mechanisms of political
accountability.
The key finding is that the agency that was structured, by a wide margin, to
be the most insulated from congressional control, the CFPB, uses significantly
less frequently the most publicly accountable regulatory instrument, the notice-
and-comment rulemaking process, as established by the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) and elaborated by courts.3 The statute establishes a process
by which agencies must provide advance notice of proposed rules, solicit public
comments, and respond to those comments when finalizing the proposed rules.4
It further provides individuals aggrieved by a rule a right to judicial review.5 This
administrative process is hypothesized to permit Congress to exercise control
over agencies both through information it obtains from the mandated written
1. Mathew McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987). McCubbins et al. emphasize legislative use of administrative
procedures to ensure accountability to the enacting Congress. But their description of the informational
role of the notice-and-comment rulemaking process, a  discussed in Part IB, infra, by facilitating
congressional monitoring of policymaking, impels agencies to be accountable to contemporaneous (i.e.,
post-enacting) Congresses. Given this Article's focus of analysis on the choice of rulemaking instrument,
the relevant Congress with regard to agency accountability is the Congress exercising monitoring and
hence sanctioning authority.
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1011 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2018)).
3. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018).
4. Id.
5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2018).
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record as well as through an early warning system provided by constituents'
exercise of the right to judicial review or commissioner dissents in multimember
6agencies.
The finding of a significant divergence in choice of regulatory instrument
by the agency that is the most independent from political accountability is robust
across a variety of comparisons, and it is therefore consistent with t e contention
that agency design matters for the choice of instrument an agency uses in
decisionmaking. Establishing such a relationship robustly has eluded the
empirical literature, as it consists in the main of single agency studies, while the
few multiagency studies of agency design have not addressed the question, as
they do not analyze the relation between organizational design and a broad array
of instrument choices.
The Article's research design does have a limitation beyond the small
number of agencies under study the number being restricted by the need to
compare agencies with broadly cognate regulatory authority namely, that the
statistical analysis cannot provide an answer to a further question: whether the
instrument through which regulation is adopted affects substantive regulatory
content. However, there is a literature examining agencies' problematic
regulation by guidance through which they can obtain outcomes that would not
be available had they used a notice-and-comment rulemaking process,7 and the
CFPB has engaged in a number of such questionable regulatory actions. Three
of the more prominent instances of such CFPB action, which were well-
publicized by the business press, are described in the Appendix. These examples
provide an interpretive context for the empirical analysis, supporting the
contention suggested by the analysis: that agency design matters, that instrument
choice matters, and that both matter importantly.
The Article is organized as follows. It begins with a primer on
administrative procedure to orient the analysis with regard to the relevant legal
framework, followed by an overview of the political science literature on agency
design which provides the analytical framework for the Article's research design.
It then identifies the salient organizational characteristics of the four agencies
under study in relation to their insulation from political accountability. After
introducing the data set, the agencies' regulatory activity is compared and
analyzed. The Article concludes with an assessment of the analysis' implications
for the CFPB's regulatory structure and more generally, for eform proposals
addressed to regulatory strategy and the literature on agency design and
administrative law.
6. McCubbins et al., supra note 1 (describing Congress's design of administrative
procedure as a mechanism for control of agency action).
7. For a recent paper citing such work, see William Baude, Congressional Control over
Agencies: The Problem of Coercive Guidance (May 30, 2016) (unpublished conference draft) (on file
with the Hoover Institution).
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I. Administrative Procedure and Literature Review
There is an extensive literature on agency design, informed by public
choice theory (also referred to as positive political theory or rational choice
theory) and transaction cost economics, that characterizes design as directed at a
principal-agent problem of (i) information asymmetry (agencies have superior
information about policy); (ii) preference divergence (legislators' and agencies'
goals differ); and (iii) commitment (one Congress cannot bind future Congresses
to ensure the durability of a policy, reducing the value of legislation to
constituents).8 A key line of research in this literature focuses on administrative
law. This section therefore begins with a sketch of the regulatory tools and
related procedural requirements that are available for administrative
decisionmaking. It then provides an overview of the slice of the theoretical and
empirical literature most pertinent o this Article's focus, the relation between an
agency's structural independence and its decisionmaking.
A. A Primer on Administrative Procedure
In 1946, Congress provided a statutory framework for agency action by
establishing requirements for rulemaking and adjudication in the APA.9 A key
innovation of the APA was codification of what has come to be referred to as
"informal" rulemaking. Section 553 of the APA, the "'informal' rulemaking"
provision, sets out a three-step rulemaking process, which requires an agency (i)
to provide advance notice of a proposed rule or a problem being investigated; (ii)
thereafter to provide the public with an opportunity to submit written comments;
and (iii) after consideration of submitted comments, to "incorporate in the rules
adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose."'1 This informal
rulemaking process, as earlier noted, is referred to as "notice-and-comment"
rulemaking, and its fundamental elements can be encapsulated in "three words:
information, participation, and accountability."" Those elements are
interrelated: the political legitimacy of rulemaking, given its management by
unelected officials, is said to rest upon public participation under "procedures
designed to ensure the rationality of the agency's decision."'2 That is, public
8. See Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010) (summarizing public
choice literature on information asymmetry and preference divergence regarding agency design);
MURRAY J. HORN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1995) (combining
commitment problem with agency problems in agency design).
9. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 273 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (2018)). Rulemaking and adjudication are the forms of administrative
agency action that have formal legal effects on people (i.e., they impose rights and obligations). See, e.g.,
GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 48 (7th ed. 2016).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018).
11. CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 53 (4th ed. 2011).
12. Id. at 168.
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comments can illuminate gaps in an agency's knowledge and provide an
understanding of real-world conditions, as well as assist an agency in gauging a
rule's acceptance by those affected.
13
The statutory procedural requirements in section 553 would appear to be
rather minimal (i.e., the notice need not specify the content of a rule, and there
is no instruction regarding what constitutes an adequate statement of basis and
purpose). However, courts have elaborated upon the statutory requirements over
time, formalizing the process such that it is said that it would be
"unrecognizable" to the APA's drafters.14 For example, courts have required the
notice to contain "sufficient detail on its content and basis in law and evidence
to allow for meaningful and informed comment,"'15 including disclosure of
"technical studies and data upon which the agency relies" in its rulemaking,
16
and directed agencies to respond, in the statement of basis and purpose, to all
serious criticisms and suggestions of comments not taken into account in the
final rule.' As these judicial emendations facilitate litigation challenging rules,
courts' increasing formalization of the notice-and-comment process is thought
by some commentators to have disincentivized agencies from engaging in
informal rulemaking and resulted in agencies instead increasing their use of less
procedurally demanding regulatory alternatives.18 There is, accordingly, a debate
in the administrative law literature over whether these procedural developments
have so "ossified" rulemaking as to hinder federal agencies' ability to formulate
policy efficiently or are a worthwhile cost of enhancing agencies' democratic
legitimacy and accountability.19
13. Id. at 168-69. Consistent with the informational purpose of the APA informal
rulemaking procedure, there is considerable evidence that agencies revise proposed rules in light of
comments received. Id. at 210-14. In reflecting on his experience as director of the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which by executive order undertakes a cost-benefit analysis of executive
agency rules before they can be finalized, Cass Sunstein states that "the importance of receiving [public]
comments may have been the chief lesson I received during my time at OIRA." CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 85 (2013).
14. LAWSON, supra note 9, at 308.
15. American Medical Ass'n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
16. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
17. La. Fed. Land Bank Ass'n v. Farm Credit Admin., 336 F.3d 1075, 1080 (D.C. Cir.
2003) ("Although the FCA is not required 'to discuss every item of fact or opinion included in the
submissions' it receives, it must respond to those 'comments which if true,... would require a change in
[the] proposed rule."' (citation omitted)). As a result of the judicial amplification of the statutory
requirements, a considerable number of lawsuits challenge the adequacy of agency rulemaking notices,
rather than the validity of final rules. See, e.g., LAWSON, supra note 9, at 388-403.
18. See KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 11, at 184 (describing the "use of devices
other than rules" as becoming widespread); see also Section I.B., infra (discussing studies observing a
decline in notice-and-comment rulemaking over the time span of the judicial opinions elaborating the
statutory requirements).
19. For a discussion of the "ossification thesis," see Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying
Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment
Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997), and for an empirical study suggesting that the thesis is
overstated, see Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures andBureaucratic
Performance: Is FederalRule-making "'Ossified? ", 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 261 (2009).
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The APA exempts an agency from following notice-and-comment when it
finds "good cause" not to do so (defined as when the informal procedure would
be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest").2" In such
circumstances, an agency must provide an explanation in the rule issued of the
rationale for its finding.21 Rules in this category are adopted without notice and
comment, but they are final actions, creating binding rights and obligations on
private parties, with equivalent legal consequences to rules issued under the
notice-and-comment process, that a person aggrieved by such action has the right
under the APA to seek judicial review.22
Interpretive rules and policy statements, along with rules related solely to
agency internal procedures or organization, are also exempt from following the
notice-and-comment procedure.23 These latter actions are referred to as
"nonlegislative rules" because they are said not to create legal obligations on
private parties, in contrast to rules that do (such as substantive rules adopted
through notice and comment, or those avoiding that process under the good cause
exemption), which are referred to as "legislative rules. '24 The category of
nonlegislative rules is comprised of a variety of agency pronouncements beyond
interpretive rules and policy statements, such as letters, manuals, and
guidelines which are often referred to under the rubric of "guidance," given
their advisory nature (although the term "guidance" is also used by agencies to
refer to specific regulatory issuances).
25
Agency guidance does not formally impose obligations on private parties
because it is expressly defined as intended to provide information about an
agency's future position on specific issues (or, as in the case of an interpretive
rule, to explain an agency's understanding of an existing rule, i.e., how it will
view private parties' obligations).26 It is, therefore, not generally deemed by
courts to be final agency action, which eliminates private parties' right to judicial
review of the policy under the APA (unless it has been enforced against them for
noncompliance).2 Accordingly, this is a crucial distinction for understanding an
20. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2018).
21. Id.
22. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018) (providing a "[r]ight of [judicial] review" to "a person ...
aggrieved by agency action"); 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018) (making "[a]ctions reviewable" when there is a "final
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court").
23. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2018).
24. See William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321,
1322 (2001).
25. See id at 1349 (criticizing the literature's use of "guidance" as a catch-all term for
nonlegislative rules).
26. See id. at 1322.
27. See Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency
Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 411 (2007); Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for
Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEx. L. REV. 331, 343 (2011); see also Abbe R. Gluck et
al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1857, 1860 (2015)
(observing that the D.C. Circuit has been "shutting the courthouse door to challenges over policy
statements ... [because] they lack the requisite finality under the APA and dismissing challenges to them
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agency's regulatory strategy. If an agency adopts a policy through a legislative
rule, then private parties can challenge such an action in court if they believe it
to be legally objectionable without having to wait until they have incurred
sanctions in an enforcement action.
It is at this point in the description of administrative law jurisprudence that
the doctrinal analysis becomes opaque. On occasion, courts have held a
challenged guidance (nonlegislative) action to be final action, and thereupon
invalidated the action because it was not adopted through a notice-and-comment
process.28 When a challenge is successful, the nonlegislative action is
characterized as having an effect equivalent to that of final agency action, under
the courts' application of a two-part test requiring first, that the challenged action
be the "consummation" of an agency's decisionmaking on the issue (i.e.,
"completed" and "not tentative") and second, that it have "legal consequences,"
or determines "rights and obligations.'29 But even while commentators describe
courts' application of the doctrine as a muddle, they invariably conclude that the
APA's finality requirement renders it extremely difficult for parties to obtain
preenforcement judicial review of nonlegislative action, and some suggest that
the trend has been to render it increasingly difficult to do so.
30
There are further differential legal consequences between legislative and
nonlegislative rules. For instance, agencies' authorizing statutes often impose
specific strictures regarding factors that an agency must consider when engaging
as unreviewable," and it "recently appears to have made it harder for agency guidance to satisfy the APA's
finality requirement").
28. See, e.g., Croplife America v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that a
"directive" imposing a moratorium on the use of third-party human test data in agency decisionmaking
processes over pesticide registration was a final agency action); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d
1015, 1022-23 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding as final action a nineteen-page, single-spaced guidance document
adding detailed monitoring requirements for emissions, under the Supreme Court's two conditions for
action to be "final": being (i) "the consummation of an agency's decisionmaking process," having been
formed over a long period of time in multiple versions and (ii) one by which "rights or obligations have
been determined" or from which "legal consequences will flow," as it required states to take specific
action that would affect the petitioning companies).
29. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997). Of course, where the litigation
entails a collateral attack on a guidance document in the context of an enforcement action for
noncompliance, the finality issue regarding judicial review is no longer relevant. The finality issue is
presented in litigation challenging a guidance document where there has been no formal enforcement
action against the complaining party.
30. David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the
Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 301, 310 (2010) (noting that "tests applied in these cases could scarcely be
called emphatic or predictable" and "doctrines such as standing, finality, ripeness, and nonreviewability
of agency inaction ... combine to make it very difficult to obtain judicial review of permissive ... agency
pronouncements"); Gluck et al., supra note 27, at 1857, 1860 (describing how the "D.C. Circuit has been
shutting the courthouse door to challenges over policy statements ... concluding that they lack the
requisite finality under the APA and dismissing challenges to them as unreviewable"); Gwendolyn
McKee, Judicial Review of Agency Guidance Documents: Rethinking the Finality Doctrine, 60 ADMIN.
L. REV. 371, 374 (2008) (describing it as "difficult if not impossible to challenge agency action at any
point prior to an enforcement action" under the current doctrinal standard); Seidenfeld, supra note 27, at
334, 376 (considering the case law distinguishing legislative and nonlegislative rules as "confusing" and
"inconsistent," but concluding that "nonetheless, the dual inquiry that governs finality predisposes courts
to determine that guidance documents are not final more often than is warranted").
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in rulemaking.31 A failure to consider those factors adequately can invalidate a
legislative rule.32 Those statutory considerations can be given short shrift in
guidance pronouncements because an agency need not provide a reasoned
explanation for the action and, as a general proposition, can avoid judicial
review, given courts' propensity not to characterize guidance as final agency
action. Moreover, because agency action in such circumstances does not provide
a record of the decisional process, which would permit an evaluation of the
quality of decisionmaking by a court that in principle occurs when an aggrieved
party challenges a notice-and-comment rulemaking, it renders it even more
difficult for parties to challenge the policy substantively, were litigation
permitted to proceed.33
In addition, an agency has greater regulatory flexibility when using
guidance not only due to the absence of procedural requirements for adoption
but also because the policy can more quickly and easily be refashioned. One of
the few constraints courts have imposed on regulatory choice of instrument is to
require that an agency's reversal of a rule adopted by a notice-and-comment
process must be accomplished through that same procedure.34 Symmetrically,
and by contrast, guidance can be reversed without following a notice-and-
comment process.
That legal consequences differ across regulatory actions is key for
appreciating the arcane complexity of the legal architecture given courts'
31. For example, the statutes authorizing the CFPB and the CFTC require, among other
factors, consideration of costs and benefits, and the statutory requirement that the SEC consider market
efficiency has been interpreted by courts to require a cost-benefit analysis as well. See 12 U.S.C. §
5512(b)(2)(A) (2018) (including in the standards for CFPB rulemaking consideration of "potential
benefits and costs to consumers and covered persons"); 7 U.S.C. § 19(a) (2018) (requiring the CFTC to
consider "costs and benefits" before promulgating a rule or issuing an order); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(b), 78c(f),
80a-2(c) (2018) (requiring the SEC to consider whether an action "will promote efficiency, competition,
and capital formation" when engaged in rulemaking); Richard L. Revesz, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the
Structure of the Administrative State: The Case of Financial Services Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG.
545, 565-68 (2017) (discussing cases remanding SEC rules for failure to consider costs and benefits).
32. See, e.g., Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (invalidating
the SEC's proxy access rule as arbitrary and capricious for inadequate economic analysis that failed to
meet the statutory cost-benefit standard); Revesz, supra note 31. In addition, the degree of judicial
deference accorded to regulatory action differs across the two categories of rules (whenjudicial review is
afforded to a nonlegislative rule). See infra notes 33 & 36.
33. The import of the Supreme Court decision i  United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218
(2001), which held that a lower level of scrutiny would be applied to agency action adopted with more
demanding procedures (i.e., rules issued in a notice-and-comment process as opposed to guidance
documents), is uncertain, as courts have split on whether to defer to the most informal actions, LAWSON,
supra note 9, at 621, and the Supreme Court itself, even after Mead, has applied the higher-level deference
of Chevron, to nonlegislative rules. Franklin, supra note 30, at 320-21. In addition, an empirical study
finds that agencies win more than a majority of cases even when courts apply a low deference level. Id.
at 321 (citing a study finding that agencies prevailed in over sixty percent of cases applying the Chevron-
predecessor Skidmore standard).
34. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206 (2015) ("[T]he D.C.
Circuit correctly read [the statute] to mandate that agencies use the same procedures when they amend or
repeal a rule as they used to issue the rule in the first instance.").
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tendency to defer to an agency's choice of regulatory instrument.35 This tendency
permits an agency, through selection of the regulatory instrument, to determine
when its policy decisions can more readily be subjected to judicial review. That
choice does present an ostensible tradeoff, as the Supreme Court has held that
the level ofjudicial scrutiny should vary with the form of action, such that greater
deference is to be afforded to actions taken under more formal procedures, such
as notice-and-comment rulemaking, compared to guidance pronouncements.36
Such a tradeoff presumably would incentivize agencies to employ the notice-
and-comment process to increase the probability that their policy judgments will
be upheld. But, contrarily, courts defer to agency interpretations of their own
regulations (which are adopted through guidance, not notice-and-comment
rulemaking).38 The doctrinal development of deference to agency interpretations
of agency rules, without appreciation of the real-world implications of that
intellectual move, makes a hash of the presumed tradeoff between regulatory
instrument (formality) and judicial review (deference).'9
The choice between notice-and-comment rulemaking and guidance is also
frequently presented as a tradeoff between regulatory flexibility and
effectiveness, on the view that the greater flexibility of guidance compared to
notice-and-comment rules is offset by guidance not being legally binding.
Although the formal distinction is technically accurate, as numerous
commentators have noted, the reality is otherwise, rendering the ostensible
distinction quite misleading. As one leading casebook puts it well:
If you are a regulated party, and the agency issues an interpretive rule or policy
statement indicating its present view of the law, you will probably make serious
efforts to comply with that rule even if it is not formally binding. At a minimum,
the rule alerts you to the kind of conduct that the agency regards as worthy of
prosecution; at a maximum, the rule may effectively dictate how the agency will
35. M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
1383, 1419 (2004) (finding that courts continue to refuse to review agency choices of policymaking tools).
36. See, e.g., Mead, 533 U.S.; Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
Magill, supra note 35, contends that courts provide agencies with leeway on the choice of instrument
precisely because they can impose different standards of review for those instruments, and, in particular,
employ greater deference to more deliberative, i.e., notice-and-comment, rulemaking. She contends that
courts thereby constrain agency choice. However, to the extent that, due to the judicial doctrine regarding
finality and firms' response to guidance, those other actions are not readily subject to judicial review,
agency behavior will not be constrained by the doctrine that courts will apply less deference to regulatory
actions adopted with less process. See text accompanying notes 27 & 29 (discussing finality doctrine) and
notes 41-42& 80 (discussing firms' response to guidance).
37. See Magill, supra note 35. But see Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic
Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory
Interpretations, 120 HARv. L. REV. 528 (2006) (contending that agencies play off the judicial approach
and select notice and comment for rules that they think courts would evaluate skeptically and contending
that agencies use guidance documents for rules that they believe courts would uphold).
38. Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone, 564 U.S. 50, 67 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (referring to "the rule that we defer to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations, a rule
in recent years attributed to our opinion in Auer v. Robbins"); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
39. See, e.g., Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1211-12 (Scalia, J., concurring) (offering criticism).
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conduct its prosecutorial adjudications. The practical effect of such rules on
regulated parties may be hard to distinguish from the practical effect of legislative
rules.
40
The unvarnished reality that firms will behave as though guidance
pronouncements are, in fact, binding rules is particularly applicable to financial
institutions, the focus of this Article's analysis, given the repeated interaction
between financial firms and regulators. This interaction facilitates regulators'
ability to retaliate on numerous dimensions through supervision and
examination, in addition to their ability to bring enforcement actions for
noncompliance with a specific policy.41 Moreover, the licensing feature of
financial regulation (i.e., regulators can shut down a bank's lines of business, as
well as a bank itself) is a powerful inducement for financial institutions to
comply with, rather than challenge, guidance pronouncements.
The divergent legal consequence regarding finality for notice-and-
comment rules as opposed to guidance is key for understanding the financial
regulation context and the sway the agencies in this study can exercise over
regulated entities. A trade association can, for instance, serve as the complainant
that seeks pre-enforcement judicial review of a legislative rule, thereby shielding
individual financial firms to some extent from potential regulatory retaliation. It
cannot do so in the guidance context, where an agency's enforcement of its
policy against an entity for noncompliance is the basis for the legal challenge
(i.e., there is in this context, obviously, one identifiable litigant).42 This firm-
shielding function supplements the more conventional explanation of trade
association litigation, that it solves a collective action problem where the
litigation cost exceeds the benefit one firm would obtain from overturning a rule
but is less than the aggregate benefit that would accrue to the industry.
As a consequence, by using guidance strategically instead of notice-and-
comment rulemaking, particularly in the financial-entity regulatory context, an
agency can obtain the benefit of a rule (regulated entities' compliance), without
incurring the procedural costs that are legally supposed to accompany the
imposition of obligations on private parties under requirements imposed on
regulatory decisionmaking by Congress and courts in order to protect the public
and regulated entities from arbitrary and capricious decisions. A critical issue,
then, is an empirical one: to what extent can an agency shape its agenda to impose
rule-like constraints on conduct while avoiding the procedural protections that
are supposed to accompany such activity? But consideration of that inquiry is
40. LAWSON, supra note 9, at 422 (emphasis in original).
41. See infra note 80 for an elaboration of this point. Illustrations of this behavior in the
context of CFPB guidance are provided in the Appendix.
42. For instance, trade associations have been a principal litigant challenging SEC rules.
See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Manufacturers v. SEC., 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (conflict minerals
disclosure rule); Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (proxy access rule);
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (one-share-one-vote xchange rule).
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not independent of another feature of administrative governance namely,
agency design, the degree to which an agency's structure is insulated from
political accountability.
B. Overview of the Agency Design Literature
Political scientists, using a principal-agent framework, have theorized that
Congress creates administrative structures and processes that constrain agencies
to implement Congress's preferred policies. They have identified multiple tools
by which Congress can implement its ends. For example, Congress can establish
a leadership structure that increases (or decreases) an agency's insulation from
presidential control, or it can specify policy objectives more broadly or narrowly,
along with providing instructions regarding considerations to be factored into
rulemaking. In addition to such ex ante mechanisms, Congress can deploy ex
post controls to discipline agencies, such as oversight hearings, in which it can
place demands upon and publicly rebuke and embarrass agency leadership, or
the appropriations process, through which it can impose budget reductions or
spending restrictions on agencies adopting policies which it finds
objectionable.4 3
This Article focuses on two core mechanisms analyzed in the agency design
literature, which are particularly relevant to the comparative analysis of the
regulatory activity of the CFPB. First, political scientists emphasize the
importance of agency independence, which is largely a function of location
within the administrative state (i.e., within or outside of the cabinet bureaucracy),
as well as leadership qualifications and terms, as a key issue in agency design.44
In a comprehensive study of the politics of agency design, Lewis characterizes
the motivation for independent commissions to be insulation of agency decisions
from the president.45 From a legislature's perspective, an independent
commission with partisan balance is a preferable structure, compared to an
agency that is within the executive branch, for mitigating preference divergence
(i.e., legislators and agencies' goals may differ) and commitment problems (i.e.,
one Congress cannot bind a future Congress to ensure the durability of a
policy).46 Namely, as a congressional majority's most severe concern with
43. Congress's mechanisms of agency control can interact as substitutes such that use
of ex ante controls could be traded off against ex post control mechanisms. See Gersen, supra note 8, at
338.
44. DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN (2003); Terry
M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? (John E. Chubb &
Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989).
45. LEWIS, supra note 44.
46. There is empirical support for the proposition that partisan balance requirements
may reduce preference divergence. See Brian D. Feinstein & Daniel J. Hemel, Partisan Balance with Bite,
118 COLUM. L. REV. 9 (2018) (finding cross-party appointments are ideologically closer to their own
party than co-party appointees are to the president and concluding that a partisan balance requirement
constrains the president, ensuring divergent views are expressed in agency deliberation that facilitates
congressional monitoring); Daniel E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of Statutory
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respect to preference divergence would relate to an agency whose
decisionmaking is dominated by the president of the opposing political party,
agencies created under divided government are more likely to be independent
commissions situated outside of the executive branch.4
Second, in a canonical contribution, McCubbins et al. advanced the thesis
that administrative law plays a pivotal function for congressional control of
agencies.48 They focus most specifically on the APA's notice-and-comment
requirement, contending that it mitigates the principal-agent problem of
information asymmetry, in the following three ways: 1) most directly, it compels
an agency to obtain and then provide relevant information regarding the
rulemaking in public; 2) it empowers constituents both to influence policy and,
when an agency does not adopt the constituents' and hence, Congress's,
preferred policy, to seek the policy's reversal through litigation and/or by
notifying Congress; and 3) upon receipt of such alerts, Congress can thereupon
apply ex post oversight and sanctions, such as budgetary restrictions, that can be
a powerful tool for affecting agency conduct. The setup of the APA, in short, is
conceptualized as a mechanism to discipline agencies and mitigate preference
divergence between an agency and Congress. This conceptualization is the
foundation of the question this Article seeks to answer concerning whether there
are institutional constraints on agencies' choice of regulatory instrument: can we
identify a relation, specifically an inverse relation, between agencies' use of
notice-and-comment rulemaking and their structural independence of legislative
control?
McCubbins et al.'s conceptualization of the APA as a mechanism for
mitigating the principal-agency problem of the administrative state is not,
however, without its skeptics, particularly among administrative law scholars
who question whether Congress exercises meaningful control over agencies
Partisan Requirements on Regulation (Am. Law & Econ. Ass'n Annual Meetings, Paper No. 73, 2007)
(examining forty years of votes of commissioners of the Federal Communications Commission and
finding a "profound" effect of commissioner ideology on votes, "corroborating that partisan requirements
genuinely constrain presidents," and that cross-party appointees appear to be more extreme than own-
party appointees, "evidenc [ing] congressional influence in the selection and oversight" of the agency).
47. LEWIS, supra note 44 (finding a positive correlation between the creation of
independent agencies and the size of the majority of the opposition party in the House); see DAVID
EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATED POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO
POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 99, 135 (1999) (finding that Congress accords less discretion
to the executive branch under a measure that includes creation of independent agencies a a constraint on
discretion, under divided government, measured by both chambers' being controlled by party opposite of
president); Patrick Corrigan & Richard L. Revesz, The Genesis of Independent Agencies, 92 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 637 (2017) (criticizing Lewis's study, as the size of the majority of the opposition party in the House
is not significant in their analysis, but finding that the creation of independent agencies i statistically
significantly positively related to the size of the majority of the opposition party in the Senate).
48. McCubbins et al., supra note 1. In referring to the preference of Congress, where
an issue is controversial such that preferences across members tarkly diverge, the terminology should be
understood as referring to the preference of the enacting coalition, congressional majority, or leadership,
according to the context.
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through the APA as theorized. 4 Moreover, as Gersen contends, McCubbins et
al. overstate Congress's ability to control agencies, because courts accord
agencies significant leeway to implement policy without following the
safeguards of notice and comment, thereby subverting Congress's administrative
design.50 But the divergent perspective of McCubbins et al. and their critics is
ultimately a disagreement over an empirical claim regarding the relative
effectiveness of agency design at producing accountable decisionmaking. Not
surprisingly, there is now an empirical literature that investigates this precise
issue.
Much of the empirical literature directed at testing the significance of the
two key features of agency design of interest independence and administrative
use of notice-and-comment rulemaking consists of studies seeking to explain
design choice in relation to political conditions (e.g., divided government) when
agencies are created. The idea informing such a research agenda is that an
agency's structure is specified at the time of its creation and rarely changes
thereafter, given the stickiness of legislation. Lewis finds that new agencies are
more likely to be independent (measured in terms of location independent
commission or within the executive branch and fixed terms and restrictions on
leadership, such as partisan balance or expertise requirements) when formed
under divided government with large majorities in the House.51 Corrigan and
Revesz find, however, that new agencies are more likely to be independent (as
measured by a different set of organizational factors) when formed under divided
government with large majorities in the Senate, and not the House.52
Nevertheless, the import of the two studies is similar, as they suggest that the
strength of a congressional majority facilitates adoption of an organizational
structure by which Congress can exert greater control, compared to that of the
president, over an agency.
Lewis further finds, as would be intuited, that agencies created by executive
order (fifty-seven percent of the data set) are more likely to be organized under
presidential control (i.e., not independent) and dramatically so, compared to
those created by statute, which are more likely to be independent commissions.53
Both Lewis and Moe also provide, in support of the contention regarding
presidential preference for non-independent agencies, anecdotes of maneuvering
over the structure of proposed new agencies, in which presidents consistently
49. See Glen 0. Robinson, Commentary on "'Administrative Arrangements and the
Political Control of Agencies": Political Uses of Structure and Process, 75 VA. L. REV. 483, 484-85
(1989).
50. Gersen, supra note 8, at 339, 344.
51. LEWIS, supra note 44.
52. Corrigan & Revesz, supra note 47, at 680 (finding Senate majorities positively
associated with creating multimember agencies, agencies with partisan balance requirements, and
litigation authority). The seven factors they identify with agency independence are described in Part ILA,
infra.
53. LEWIS, supra note 44, at 126.
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seek executive control (by agency location within the executive branch) in
contrast with congressional advocacy for independent commissions.54
In addition to studies analyzing the political conditions under which
agencies are created, there is a strand in the literature that seeks to demonstrate
influence by Congress (or the president) on agency policies. The bulk of those
studies analyze the decisionmaking of a single or a few agencies, and, more
importantly, few seek to examine the control mechanisms of agency design that
are the focus of this Article agency independence in relation to administrative
procedure, that is, the form in which regulatory action is undertaken.55 The
research questions of two recent studies, by Berry and Gersen and by O'Connell,
are most on point for this Article's focus, as they investigate the relation between
agency independence and activity.
56
Berry and Gersen examine agencies' awarding of grants to congressional
districts from 1984 to 2007, contending that the allocation of funds is a constant
decisional context hat better permits a comparison of the impact of differences
in agency structure on an agency's responsiveness to political actors than other
forms of agency decisionmaking. They find that there is a presidential effect:
districts receive more funds when their representative is a member of the
president's party, when the agency is less independent (as measured by the
proportion of political appointees in the agency's upper echelons). However, for
the most independent (i.e., highly insulated) agencies, the representative being a
member of the president's party has no effect on district funding.58 They also
find congressional influence: there is a significantly positive effect on a district's
funding when its representative is a member of the majority party and the agency
has a higher number of Senate-approved appointees.59
Although the precise mechanism cannot be identified, Berry and Gersen
suggest hat principals (Congress and the president) are selecting what they term
54. Id.; Moe, supra note 44.
55. For a list of such studies, see Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, Agency
Design and Distributive Politics, 126 YALE. L.J. 1002, 1006 n.8 (2017).
56. See id; Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical
Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889 (2008).
57. Berry & Gersen, supra note 55, at 1014, 1018.
58. As the proportion of political appointees (their proxy for presidential control and
hence, non-independence) increases by one standard deviation (twenty-two percent), the funds received
increase by nearly seven percent when a district moves into the president's party. Id. at 1031-32. There
was no effect on district funding by having a representative who was a member or chair of the committee
with jurisdiction over an agency.
59. The findings are not robust, however, to alternative independence variables. They
mention testing variables that distinguish agencies by whether they were founded during divided
government or the number of branches controlled by the Democratic Party at founding, none of which
evince the same relation of political responsiveness as the appointee variable. But they do not test variables
identifying specific structural features of agencies. Berry & Gersen, supra note 55, at 1035. Agencies that
are governed by boards or commissions are found to provide more funding to districts of members of the
majority party (but not the president's party), but the finding's significance is discounted by the authors
because there are only four such agencies in the data set, and a commission structure is "virtually
coterminous" with other independence variables, such as fixed terms and limits on the president's removal
power (which are not separately investigated). Id.
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the "'right type' of appointee" whose "preferences [are] sympathetic to the
principal. 60 Namely, agencies with more appointees subject to Senate
confirmation would appear to be more responsive to the majority party in the
Senate, while agencies with fewer such appointees would appear to be more
responsive to the party of the president, as they distribute more funds,
respectively, to districts represented by members of the party of their appointer.6
Berry and Gersen therefore conclude that agency design matters. However, there
are few independent commissions in the sample, which suggests that Congress
does not use such a structure when it is creating an agency with grant-giving
authority, and as a consequence, that the findings may not be relevant for such
agencies. Moreover, their findings are not robust across different measures of
agency insulation, and in particular, more straightforward definitions of agency
independence either have no significant correlation with grants or cannot be
satisfactorily examined given the data set, further suggesting that the
generalizability of the study to commission and non-grant-giving agencies is
problematic .62
The second study, by O'Connell, investigates both the number and form of
reported (legislative) rulemakings by the fifteen cabinet departments and thirty-
two executive and independent agencies from 1983 to 2003, with a series of
hypothesis tests directed at a subset of five independent commissions and five
executive branch entities.63 She examines three types of legislative rules: rules
adopted by notice-and-comment, interim final rules, and direct final rules.
Interim rules are typically adopted under the APA "for cause" exemption to
notice-and-comment rulemaking, and are effective immediately on publication,
with comments, if solicited at all, to be received ex post. A direct final rule is a
60. Id. at 1038.
61. Id. at 1033.
62. The methodology has limitations. For instance, Berry and Gersen use district-by-
agency fixed effects to address the potential confounding effect of agency mission, as opposed to agency
structure or political control, that some agencies' grants will disproportionately go to one party's districts,
i.e., Department of Housing and Urban Development grants tend to go to urban areas, which are more
likely to elect Democrats. However, while technically proper, use of a district fixed effect to address the
difficulty that agency missions coincide with districts represented by particular parties, is less informative
than including specific variables related to districts and agency missions, such as urbanization or
demographic data. Besides providing more granular controls, separately including such variables can
control for district changes over time, whereas fixed effects treat district characteristics as unvarying over
time. This is an important distinction because, for the research design to work, characteristics of a district
in terms of what level of grant is appropriate must not have changed when it elects an individual from a
different party. Yet it would seem equally, if not more, plausible that a change in the political party of a
district's representative is a function of changing district characteristics which could affect a grant, such
as, a change in demographic composition. Such an effect is obscured by the use of a fixed effects approach.
Finally there is a relation between agency structure and outcomes that would appear to open the findings
to question: agencies that have fewer political appointees also tend to be entitlement agencies, such as the
Department of Veterans Affairs and Social Security Administration, which allocate funds (grants) to
designated individuals, Berry & Gersen, supra note 55, at 1025, which limits such agencies' ability to
adjust grant levels as a district's representation shifts. Such a phenomenon could bias the results to find
less responsiveness in less politicized agencies when it is the grant formula, and not the proportion of
political appointees, that is affecting the outcome.
63. O'Connell, supra note 56.
Vol. 36, 2019
Does Agency Structure Affect Agency Decisionmaking?
rule that is effective on publication but voided upon receipt of adverse comments
thereafter, and thus it is expected to be used for noncontroversial, technical
subjects.64 While all three types of rules are "legislative" rules, the latter two lack
the democratic legitimacy inherent in notice-and-comment rules, as the reasoned
deliberation that follows the collection of information from affected parties and
facilitates, in principle, congressional efforts to maintain control over an
agency's decisions, is absent.
One of O'Connell's findings would appear to have pertinence for the
empirical analysis of this study. She presents data suggesting that the proportion
of notices of proposed rulemaking (regulatory filings that indicate an agency's
plan to engage in a notice-and-comment rulemaking), compared to legislative
rules finalized without obtaining comments (direct final rules and interim final
rules), has declined over time, although she notes that an "overall" lower
proportion of independent agencies' rulemaking took the form of direct and
interim final rules compared to that of executive branch agencies.65 Accordingly,
when analyzing differences in agencies' use of specific regulatory instruments
in this study, it will be necessary to control for a potential time trend. Otherwise,
any finding of a difference across agencies could be mistakenly attributed to
organizational structure when it was a temporal effect.
66
Despite their focus on the impact of agency structure on decisionmaking,
neither the Berry and Gersen nor the O'Connell studies go to this Article's
inquiry. The agency decision that Berry and Gersen study does not permit
examination of whether agency structure affects the form of decisionmaking, that
is, whether a more insulated agency will behave so as to attenuate, rather than
facilitate public and congressional monitoring of its decisions. Using grant
decisions has the benefit, as Berry and Gersen observe, of facilitating cross-
64. Direct final rules have no statutory imprimatur, as such rules do not fit into the
APA's enumerated exemptions, but rather, their use is a practice devised and encouraged by the
Administrative Conference of the United States to expedite the adoption of noncontroversial rules. See id.
at 903. In contrast to the treatment of adverse comments on direct final rules, comments on interim rules
need not be taken into account, and typically, interim rules are left as is, in effect becoming final rules. Id.
65. Id. at 930, 933, 935. O'Connell does not provide statistical tests of whether there is
such a trend over time or whether the temporal pattern differs across agency structure. It should also be
noted that the number of proposed rulemaking notices per year is not one of continuous decline, but rather,
there is an upward surge in the 1990s, and the activity in the decade before and after the surge decade
appears to be relatively constant around a level that is only slightly lower in the post-1990 than pre-1990
period, apart from a sharp drop in 2001 that rebounds thereafter. Id. at 931 charts 1 & 2.
66. O'Connell also found significant differences in the number of completed notice-
and-comment rulemakings dependent upon the political environment, i.e., whether the president was a
Democrat or Republican or whether there was unified or divided government. Id. at 956-57; see also Jason
Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Divided Government and US. Federal Rulemaking, 3 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 128, 134, 138 (2009) (studying notice-and-comment rulemaking by forty agencies from
1985 to 2005, and finding such activity significantly decreased by executive branch agencies in periods
of divided government). Because all of the post-Dodd-Frank years when agency activity is investigated
in this study, which commences with the establishment of the CFPB, occurred under a Democrat as
president and divided government, whether the political environment would differentially impact agencies
with differing degrees of independence from Congress could not be investigated.
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agency comparisons, but it also restricts the question that can be answered
regarding the impact of agency structure.
O'Connell, by contrast, is examining different forms of agency
decisionmaking. But when the issue concerns the relation between agency
structure and rulemaking, the more critical comparison, in my view, and hence
the focus of this Article, is between the use of legislative and nonlegislative rules,
given the significantly different legal consequences that accompany the two
types of regulatory activity.6 Namely, while interim rules, direct final rules and
interpretive rules are all issued without engaging in notice-and-comment, in
contrast to interpretive rules, interim and final rules are final agency action.
Accordingly, all of the rules in O'Connell's study offer aggrieved parties the
ability to seek judicial review under the APA, and lawsuits involving interim and
final direct rules would subject those agency actions to any considerations
specifically required by Congress (i.e., meeting a cost-benefit standard).68 In
short, the considerable advantage of the Unified Agenda, O'Connell's data
source, is its comprehensive coverage of all federal agencies, but it comes at a
cost, in this instance, of including only legislative rulemaking. As a consequence,
O'Connell's data set does not permit an assessment of the key dichotomy in
agency instrument choice which is the focus of this Article's inquiry, the
implementation of policy through the use of legislative versus nonlegislative
rulemaking.69
II. Research Design: Comparing Agency Independence across the CFPB,
67. See supra text accompanying notes 27-33.
68. However, interim final rules adopted under the APA's "good cause" exemption to
notice-and-comment rulemaking a determination made by the agency are exempt from compliance
with certain federal statutes, such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act, which requires agencies to detail the
impact of a rule on small businesses. 5 U.S.C. § 601(2) (2018) (defining rule to which statute applies as
one for which an agency must publish a notice of proposed rulemaking). Of course, guidance and policy
statements are also exempt from such compliance.
69. A few studies have examined agencies' use of guidance rather than rulemaking,
with differing conclusions concerning whether agencies behave strategically in making such choices, but
because none of these studies seek to associate agency structure with policymaking choice, they are not
discussed. See, e.g., James T. Hamilton & Christopher H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulators and the Choice
of Rulemaking Procedures: The Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Hazardous Waste,
57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111 (1994) (concluding that the policymaking choice of the Environmental
Protection Agency depends on a variety of factors, such as the cost of obtaining agreement among
interested parties on a policy or likelihood ofjudicial review, such that, guidance is used when negotiation
cost or probability of judicial monitoring is high, which are deemed to indicate a strategic choice to evade
congressional constraints); Connor N. Raso, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance
Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782 (2010) (finding policymaking choice not to be strategic, in a study with
various samples consisting of four, ten, or fifteen executive departments and one independent agency, due
to the following findings: agencies do not use guidance significantly more in times of divided government
than unified government; agencies do not increase guidance at the end of a president's second term; the
number of significant guidance issued is far less than the number of significant rules; and the Bush
administration revised only twelve percent of significant guidance documents issued by all previous
administrations). In contrast to Raso, this Article cannot similarly identify significant guidance because
only executive agencies during the George W. Bush administration were required to provide such
characterizations of the guidance they, or their agencies, previously issued, under his Executive Order No.
13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 23, 2007), which was revoked by President Obama.
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CPSC, CFTC, and SEC
This study's research design compares the use of legislative and
nonlegislative rules by four agencies, the CFPB, CPSC, CFTC, and SEC, in order
to analyze the relation between agency independence and choice of instrument
for implementing regulatory policy. After introducing the key indicia of agency
independence, the section provides the rationale for the agencies to be compared.
It then identifies their common and divergent indicia of independence.
A. Criteria ofAgency Independence
The most comprehensive effort at identifying agency independence, by
Datla and Revesz, enumerates seven distinguishing characteristics."0 By defining
independence along a continuum of combinations of those features, they seek to
replace the prevalent approach in the legal literature, which defines
independence by reference to whether the agency has a multimember structure
with commissioners serving fixed terms with removal only for cause, with a
more nuanced one. 7 1 Datla and Revesz's seven indicia for assessing agency
independence are:
(i) statutory removal protection;
(ii) fixed terms for agency leadership (referred to as "tenure specified");
(iii) multimember (versus single-headed) agency structure;
(iv) partisan balance requirements for multimember agencies;
(v) authority to conduct litigation without having to go through the Department
of Justice (DOJ);
(vi) authority to bypass centralized review by the executive branch agency, Office
of Management and Budget (OMB), in submitting budget requests to Congress,
and in clearing congressional testimony or proposed legislation; and
(vii) formal adjudication authority.
7 2
In addition to providing a definition of independence that is both more
comprehensive and functional, Datla and Revesz's multifactor approach has a
further benefit for this Article's inquiry. By isolating those characteristics that
the four agencies in this study share, and more particularly, those that the CFPB
does not share with the other three agencies, the analysis can focus on specific
70. Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and
Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 775 (2013).
71. See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 8, at 347 (defining the benchmark of independence as
leadership serving a fixed term that cannot be removed by the president except for cause); Rachel E.
Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 16-17
(2010) (providing numerous citations and concluding that "[a]ccording to the existing legal literature and
case law, the defining hallmark of an independent agency is that it is headed by someone who cannot be
removed at will by the president but instead can be removed only for good cause"). The political science
literature takes a more functional approach and considers additional factors beyond that of the legal
literature, such as location in the bureaucracy. E.g., LEWIS, supra note 44.
72. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 70, at 786-809.
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factors of independence. Namely, to the extent that a significant difference in
choice of regulatory instrument between the CFPB and the other cognate
agencies is identified, it can be inferred that the CFPB's missing characteristic(s)
explain the observed difference. There is a wrinkle, however, in this approach.
Datla and Revesz do not include as an indicium of independence a further key
distinguishing feature among the agencies included in this study: whether an
agency is subject to the congressional appropriations process. Accordingly, the
analysis will not be able to strip out an effect of the CFPB's rather distinctive
financing arrangement from the Datla and Revesz independence characteristics.
B. Selection of Comparable Agencies
To study the relation between agency independence and regulatory
strategy, a set of cognate agencies, albeit with differing degrees of structural
independence from politics, were identified by two critical criteria. First, the
agencies need to share a broadly similar regulatory mission in order to control
for differences in jurisdictional subject matter that could require different
regulatory strategies, which would muddy the ability to identify a link between
structure and decisionmaking. As the CFPB is the focus of the inquiry because
of the unusually enduring controversy over its establishment years after its
statutory creation, the comparison agencies are drawn from regulators of
financial and consumer products. Second, the agencies cannot be executive
branch agencies.
Executive agencies are excluded for two related reasons. First, because they
are subject to presidential control, they are self-evidently noncomparable in
degree of political insulation to nonexecutive agencies such as the CFPB.
Second, the rationale for the Article's investigating the relative use of notice-
and-comment rulemaking in relation to agency structure is the view of that
process as a critical mechanism, given its information-revealing properties, by
which Congress exercises control over agencies. By contrast, the president does
not need such a mechanism to obtain information regarding agency policy given
his immediate control over, and potentially constant communication with, the
leadership of executive branch agencies. Accordingly, the incentive to use
particular regulatory strategies fundamentally differs between independent and
executive branch agencies. Although the combined criteria reduce the number of
agencies whose activity can be investigated, they ensure that the analysis will
provide a cleaner test of the impact of agency structure on the form of an
73. Datla and Revesz include a tangentially related item that agency budgeting bypasses
executive review (item (vi) in the list in the text), which is true as a matter of course for agencies not
subject to appropriations, but characterizes a broader set of agencies and thus better serves their purpose
both as the number of administrative entities financed outside of the appropriations process i small, and
as their principal focus, in contrast to that of this Article, is on measuring agency independence from
presidential, rather than congressional, control.
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agency's policymaking than would an analysis including both executive and
nonexecutive branch agencies and those with noncognate missions.
The criteria led to the selection of three agencies to compare with the CFPB:
the CPSC, CFTC, and SEC. The choice of the CPSC seeks to match agency
mission and timing. Namely, the CPSC is an agency with an analogous mission
to that of the CFPB: protecting consumers from products deemed harmful. In
addition to having cognate missions of consumer protection, upon establishment,
both agencies assumed regulatory responsibility for numerous statutes that had
been within the purview of a number of existing agencies and executive
departments. But while the originator of the idea to create the CFPB had
presented the CPSC as the model animating her proposal, it has a conventional
organizational structure for an independent agency, and so is subject to greater
congressional control than the CFPB. It therefore permits a well-matched
institutional contrast to the CFPB.
An advantage of comparing the CFPB and CPSC is timing in the life cycle
of an agency: an agency's activities in its initial years of operation might well
vary from those at a more mature stage. It will have to make a host of judgments
at the outset regarding its authorizing statutes, including whether to revise any
inherited rules and interpretations, as well as issues of first impression under
those statutes, which will differ from issues confronted by an established
regulator. However, given the forty-plus years separating the two agencies'
creation, norms of regulatory practice could have evolved, which would diminish
the appropriateness of the comparison. Accordingly, in addition to examining
the CPSC's activity in the startup phase, its activity over the identical interval
(2011 to 2016) as the initial five years of the CFPB's operation is also
investigated.
To the extent that there is a significant difference in instrument choice
between the CPSC and CFPB in their initial years, then the second comparison
should isolate whether any divergence is due to evolving administrative law
conventions rather than a difference in agency structure, by indicating whether
the CPSC's usage is consistent over time. Motivating this concern is
commentators' contention that in the 1970s, notice-and-comment rulemaking
was less well established than in subsequent years. 6 If that contention is
74. Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate: If It's Good Enough for Microwaves, It's
Good Enough for Mortgages: Why We Need a Consumer Financial Product Safety Commission,
DEMOCRACY (Summer 2007), https:Hdemocracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/
[https://perma.cc/3NPH-BVLZ].
75. A consistency comparison for CPSC activity over time is particularly valuable for
validating its comparability with the CFPB, as the statute creating the CPSC contained an innovative
process for standard-setting that deviated from the APA to provide greater public participation. This
experiment was judged a failure (as was the agency in its early years of operation) and the relevant
provisions were repealed in 1981. See Moe, supra note 44.
76. See Gluck et al., supra note 27, at 1792 n.3 ("[T]he Supreme Court's 1973 decision
in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co .... which held that agencies need only use formal,
trial-like proceedings in limited circumstances ... turned agencies to notice-and-comment rulemaking as
their primary mode of action.").
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accurate, then consistency in agency use across the two time intervals would not
simply mitigate potential concern regarding comparability of agency practice
over time but would also add confidence to the import of finding a greater use of
informal rulemaking by an agency commencing activity in the 1970s compared
to one launched in the 2010s. Because the view that notice-and-comment
rulemaking was less well established in the 1970s would predict that the
direction of use should be lower in the 1970s, the opposite finding would bolster
confidence in interpreting divergent practices across the agencies as indicative
of agency design affecting instrument choice. A finding of no difference in CPSC
practice over the two intervals could also suggest that there is no or an
inconsequential ife-cycle effect, or that any such effect is washed out within five
years of operation.
The CFPB and CPSC are agencies with comparable missions directed at a
different type of product financial versus physical and there is a further
potentially salient difference that might influence regulatory decisionmaking
beyond any difference in organizational structure. Creating the CFPB, as earlier
noted, was a component of Dodd-Frank, comprehensive legislation in which
Congress placed new and considerable regulatory demands on numerous
existing financial market regulators as well as the new entity, in response to the
global financial crisis of 2008-09. Accordingly, in an effort to control for
potential differences in regulatory climate as well as product, the analysis also
includes the SEC and CFTC. Those two agencies' jurisdictional scope
encompasses financial products traded in retail markets, and their stated
regulatory mission to foster markets and adopt rules protecting market
participants parallels that of the CFPB. In addition, in contrast to the CPSC,
those agencies were confronted with extensive regulatory demands through
specified delegations in Dodd-Frank, as was the CFPB. But their organizational
structure matches that of the CPSC, and hence they provide additional
benchmarks for evaluating the CFPB's regulatory decisionmaking.
The CFTC provides a further comparative benefit, for it was created in the
1970s, shortly after the establishment of the CPSC. It thereby has a dual function,
as both a life cycle and political environment comparator with the CFPB. In
addition, analyzing the CFTC's activity in both time periods tests the consistency
of its choice of instrument. In the first period, the CFTC operated as a new
agency undertaking its initial statutory implementation, and later, as an
77. See Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 § 3, 7 U.S.C. § 5 (2018); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 2,5, 10(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78b, 78e, 78j(b) (2018). Both the SEC and CFTC have
broader regulatory missions than the CFPB, regulating trading markets and market professionals, not all
of which relate to retail investments, with the bulk of the products regulated by the CFTC traded by
sophisticated institutions. But even if the CFTC is considerably less oriented toward individual consumers
than the CFPB, it provides a useful comparison, because it serves as a control for Dodd-Frank mandates
in assessing policymaking choices, while it also functions as an agency life cycle control. I do not analyze
activity following the creation of the SEC because it was established in 1934, prior to the APA's
enactment, and hence before the informal rulemaking process was devised, rendering the SEC's initial
regulatory activity not comparable to that of agencies founded in a later era.
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established agency, it confronted the extensive demands of Dodd-Frank. These
circumstances were simultaneously experienced by the CFPB."8
An additional advantage of comparing the four agencies for the statistical
analysis is that they all exercise similar control over regulated entities, either by
product gatekeeping (CPSC and CFPB) or ongoing supervisory relationships
with regulated entities (CFPB, CFTC, and SEC).79 These are regulatory contexts
in which guidance can, for all practical purposes, function as a rule for regulated
entities, as the earlier quoted Lawson casebook observed, because such entities
might well perceive an existential threat from noncompliance as they are at risk
of being put out of business by an enforcement action banning a core product or
imposing punitive damages with possibly fatal reputational harm.80 Hence, there
need not be concern in interpreting divergent relative use of guidance and notice-
and-comment rulemaking across the four agencies as due to guidance having a
differential impact on the behavior of regulated entities, as they should be equally
78. The life cycle comparison between the CFTC and CFPB is not as proximate a match
as that between the CPSC and CFPB because the CFTC succeeded one agency operating under one statute,
whereas both the CFPB and CPSC consolidated regulatory authority that had been dispersed over a
number of entities. The need to manage regulations adopted by diverse agencies implementing dissimilar
statutes could call for a different regulatory response than that of the CFTC, with a more homologous
predecessor and only one statute to enforce. However, the scope of the CFTC's regulatory jurisdiction
was vastly expanded at its founding beyond that of its predecessor, to include new financial derivative
products and not solely agricultural commodities, whose heterogeneity would suggest a regulatory context
whose requirements more closely parallel those arising from the consolidation of disparate regulatory
authority in the CFPB and CPSC.
79. The Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) also regulates entities regulated
by the CFPB, with similar supervisory relationships, and previously had responsibility for some consumer
financial product protection legislation that Dodd-Frank transferred to the CFPB. But it is excluded from
the research design because as an executive branch agency, it is subject to the president's direct sphere of
control, rendering it structurally accountable to one of the political branches. Hence, it operates under a
different incentive system regarding regulatory choices.
80. See Raso, supra note 69, at 803 (arguing that agencies obtain more voluntary
compliance from guidance when they have "gatekeeping power over private parties," such as the U.S.
Food & Drug Administration, as that power provides "strong incentives" to regulated entities to
cooperate). Moreover, financial institutions can be subject to existential threats from cross-agency
regulatory action, which exacerbates a perceived need to comply rather than challenge nonlegislative
action: namely, noncompliance with CFPB guidance could result in retaliation from a financial
institution's prudential banking supervisor, and not solely the CFPB. This is not merely a speculative
issue: a telling example involves the CFPB's actions regarding Ally Bank. The CFPB director serves on
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Board (FDIC) and the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC), which is comprised of the heads of all of the financial regulatory agencies, and both institutions
have important decisional authority over regulated firms. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1812, 5321(b) (2018). Ally Bank
settled, rather than challenged, a questionable enforcement action by the CFPB that was based on a
problematic guidance document, due to the threat of adverse retaliatory action by other supervisory
agencies. Paul Sperry, Obama Bullied Bank to Pay Racial Settlement Without Proof.- Report, N.Y. POST
(Feb. 7, 2016, 5:59 AM), https://nypost.com/2016/02/07/obama-bullied-bank-to-pay-racial-settlement-
without-proof-report/ [https:Hperma.cc/NHC4-LA7E]. At the time of the CFPB action, Ally needed
permission from the Federal Reserve (Fed) to remain a financial holding company in order to retain lines
of business that were essential for its survival. Id. It was also under review by the FDIC for how well it
was complying with the Community Reinvestment Act. Id. CFPB lawyers met with Fed and FDIC
officials and thereafter informed Ally that the company would be assured favorable treatment by the Fed
and FDIC were the CFPB action "prompt[ly] and robust[ly] resolved." Id. The guidance at issue, which
concerns the indirect financing of automobile dealer loans, is discussed in the Appendix.
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motivated to comply rather than challenge policies implemented through
guidance by any of the agencies.
C. Comparison ofAgency Independence Characteristics
The CFPB, CFTC, CPSC, and SEC share four of Datla and Revesz's
criteria, diverging on (i) statutory removal restrictions, (ii) multimember
structure, and (iii) the partisan balance requirement. The CFPB lacks a
multimember structure and, correlatively, a partisan balance requirement. The
SEC and CFTC commissioners have fixed terms of office but no formal
protection as the agency authorizing statutes have no explicit removal
restrictions. However, there would appear to be no practical difference created
by the omitted language, as courts and commentators consider SEC (and other
independent agency) commissioners to have removal protection despite the
statutory lacuna.81 Apart from the independence characteristics identified by
Datla and Revesz, there are a few additional, agency-specific structural
differences regarding the agencies' insulation from political accountability to be
noted for their potential impact on the empirical analysis. Of these further
differences, the most consequential has already been mentioned: the CFPB is not
subject to the appropriations process.
81. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
509 (2010) (deciding the case with the understanding that SEC commissioners can be removed only for
cause); Datla & Revesz, supra note 70, at 789, 833 (citing both securities law scholar and former SEC
Chairman William Cary's view of constraint on the president from removing a commissioner despite a
lack of a statutory limitation and a federal appellate court decision implying for-cause removal protection
for SEC commissioners). Moreover, no president would appear to have behaved differentially toward
commissioners of agencies with statutory protection and those without it. The explanation Datla and
Revesz advance for such behavior is caution against having to litigate removal, in conjunction with
political costs that would accompany any removal. Id. at 787, 789. Vermeule describes a constraint on
other actors to treat such commissioners as having removal protection as a "convention," an "unwritten
political norm," regarding agency independence. Adrian Vermeule, Conventions ofAgency Independence,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1165-66 (2013). The practical implication of both explanations is the same:
there is no meaningful difference regarding removal protection for commissioners of multimember
agencies located outside of the executive branch whether operating under statutes that are explicit or silent
on the subject. It should further be noted that the statutory formulation of the removal restrictions varies
somewhat for the CFPB and CPSC, but as Datla and Revesz discuss, such differences are of "limited
practical effect" given the absence ofjudicial interpretations of specific removal clauses. Datla & Revesz,
supra note 70, at 788. This interpretation is supported by the Supreme Court's very broad interpretation
of "good cause" removal in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 729 (1986) (noting that statutory removal
for "good cause" defined as "inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance" permits removal for any "actual
or perceived transgression of the principal's will") and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988)
(stating that "good cause" permits removal for an officer "[not] competently performing his or her
statutory responsibilities").
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1. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
The establishment of the CFPB consolidated in one agency functions that
had previously been allocated across seven federal agencies.82 As earlier
mentioned, it was given a comparatively anomalous autonomous structure for a
U.S. administrative agency.3 It is organized analogously to a cabinet department
in that it has a single director, but, in contrast to cabinet department secretaries,
who serve at the president's pleasure, the CFPB director has statutory removal
protection.84 The agency is further independent of the executive by location, as
it was placed within the Federal Reserve (Fed) System. Despite its location, Fed
Board governors may neither intervene in the CFPB's affairs; review or delay
implementation of its rules; nor consolidate the bureau, its functions, or its
responsibilities with any other office or division of the Fed.
85
An equally, if not more important, feature that is unique to the CFPB is its
funding arrangement: it is independent of both Congress and the president, for it
is not subject to the annual appropriations process. The director sets his own
budget, which is funded by the Fed (capped at twelve percent of the Fed's total
operating expenses).86 There are a few other administrative agencies that are not
subject to the appropriations process, but they tend to be prudential regulators of
financial institutions and have multimember leadership structures, such as the
Fed and the FDIC, and far narrower, technical missions. Both of these
82. 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2018); Leonard J. Kennedy et al., The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1142-
43 (2012).
83. A number of commentators have highlighted the CFPB's anomalous structure. See
Jacob E. Gersen, Administrative Law Goes to Wall Street: The New Administrative Process, 65 ADMIN.
L. REV. 689, 703-09 (2013); Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark and a Postscript Assessment of the
Iron Law of Financial Regulation, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 25, 75-83 (2014); Todd Zywicki, The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856 (2013).
84. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(1), (c)(3) (2018).
85. Id. § 5492(b)(2).
86. Id. § 5497(a), (c).
87. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 70, at 793 tbl.3 (listing agencies with multimember
structures); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-864, SEC OPERATIONS: IMPLICATIONS OF
ALTERNATIVE FUNDING STRUCTURES 11-12 (2002) (listing agencies with truly independent funding). The
OCC is not a multimember organization, but in contrast to the CFPB, the Comptroller serves at the
pleasure of the president with no restrictions on removal and, like the Fed and FDIC, it has a more
technical mission than the CFPB, being a prudential regulator. The CFPB's financing arrangement was
explained in the Senate report accompanying the bill that became Dodd-Frank as necessary to avoid
political pressure in the appropriations process that was said to have limited the effectiveness of the Office
of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), which regulated the government-sponsored entities
(GSEs) securitizing and guaranteeing mortgages. S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 163 (2010). The comparison is
a rationalization of a decision made for other ends, as the agencies have nothing in common. OFHEO's
function overseeing the GSEs was not allocated to the CFPB, so whatever pressure OFHEO
experienced would not be relevant to the CFPB's activities. In addition, OFHEO's successor agency, the
Federal Housing Finance Agency, created in 2008 with a single-director, independently-financed
structure, in contrast to the CFPB, has a far more circumscribed mission as a prudential regulator, as did
OFHEO, paralleling other independently funded financial agencies. Moreover, as the GSEs are now
operating in receivership, their extensive political lobbying activities and lavish campaign contributions
have ended.
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differences from the CFPB's structure multimember leadership and narrow,
technical mission are critical for appreciating how those agencies' setup could
maintain greater political accountability despite Congress's ceding budgetary
authority, in contrast to that of the CFPB.
First, in contrast to the CFPB's single-director structure, the prevalent
structure for agencies exempt from the appropriations process i a multimember
agency. That feature is consistent with multimember commissions tending to be
preferred by Congress when establishing an agency under divided government.
No doubt, that preference is due to an expectation that such an agency will be
more responsive to its objectives than those of the president, and such an
expectation could provide as well the rationale for entrusting an agency to act
with financial independence.88 Second, and more important, such agencies also
tend to have a narrow technical mission prudential regulation and the setting
of monetary policy. Circumscribing the scope of agency authority mitigates
accountability issues and thereby limits potential abuse otherwise generated by
independence from the appropriations process.89 The CFPB's expansive grant of
authority to "ensur[e] that all consumers have access to markets for consumer
financial products and services" that are "fair, transparent, and competitive," is
the antithesis of a narrow, technical mission.90
There is, moreover, a widely acknowledged distinction between the
mission of the Fed and that of the CFPB as it relates to the need for independence.
The core and well-accepted rationale for the independence of a central bank from
political accountability is to resolve a problem of time-inconsistency: elected
officials, whose horizon is short given the length of terms in office, have an
incentive to press for low interest rates to benefit constituents in the short term,
even when such a monetary policy would lead to an undesirable longer term
outcome of increased inflation and poor economic performance.9' An
independent central bank is believed to be able to withstand political pressure
and thereby credibly commit to focus on the performance of the economy in the
long run. Paul Tucker, a former central banker in the United Kingdom, contends
88. LEWIS, supra note 44, at 60, 126 (finding that agencies created in divided
government are more likely to be independent commissions when there is a large majority in Congress);
Corrigan & Revesz, supra note 47 (finding similarly); see also EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra note 47,
at 97, 135 (observing that Congress delegates less to the executive branch under divided government,
where one component in the delegation index is the location of the agency, e.g., whether the agency is an
independent commission, independent agency, in the cabinet or executive branch, etc.); supra Section I.B
(summarizing studies on agency responsiveness to Congress). In addition, as noted earlier, a multimember
structure can facilitate constituent and congressional monitoring from information about decisionmaking
provided in commissioner dissents, and thereby better align agency and congressional policy preferences.
See supra text accompanying note 6.
89. Note, Independence, Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment:
The Impact of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protection, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1822, 1823-
24 (2012).
90. 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (a) (2018).
91. See Helge Berger et al., Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and
Evidence, 15 J. ECON. SURVEYS 3 (2001).
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that a need for credible commitment more generally is the key rationale for
creating fully independent agencies, that is, agencies insulated from "day-to-day
politics."92 That widely-accepted rationale for central bank independence, as
well as Tucker's more general thesis, is inapposite for the CFPB, as there is no
such divergence between time horizon and social welfare in legislators' policy
preference. Nor is there an otherwise evident need for credible commitment in
the consumer protection context, and, indeed, none of the predecessor agencies
whose authority over consumer financial products was consolidated in the CFPB
had such an organizational structure.
Although the CFPB director must file semi-annual reports with Congress,
there is minimal leverage that Congress can bring to bear to influence the agency
to alter policies that it finds objectionable, given its lack of budgetary control
which is a key disciplining technique due to the stickiness of the legislative status
quo. 93 Congress, for example, extensively and successfully uses limitation
riders in appropriations bills, which range from forbidding issuance of specific
regulations to curtailing everyday decisions regarding statutory implementation,
along with other "extralegal" techniques, such as accompanying nonstatutory
directives regarding spending, to constrain agencies' actions.4 Appropriations
riders are a particularly effective means for a legislative majority to exercise
control because they have a privileged legislative status (i.e., they are subject to
special floor rules preventing minority holdup).95
2. Consumer Product Safety Commission
The CPSC was established in 1972 with expansive authority over all
consumer products, and enforcement responsibility for a multitude of preexisting
product safety statutes, as well as a more comprehensive new statute creating it,
similar to the authorizing statute of the CFPB. It would appear to have the most
extensive jurisdiction of the four agencies, as it has jurisdiction over more than
"a million producers and sellers" of "an estimated ten thousand" products.96 Of
92. PAUL TUCKER, UNELECTED POWER: THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY IN CENTRAL
BANKING AND THE REGULATORY STATE (2018).
93. Senate rules that permit a minority to block legislation do not apply in the budget
reconciliation process. If the CFPB were to require additional funds beyond those obtained from the Fed
and fines that it imposes on regulated entities, then it would have to request a supplemental congressional
appropriation, which would then provide an opportunity for Congress to exert influence. Zywicki, supra
note 83, at 888-89. As of yet, a director has not put forth a budget that exceeds those funding sources.
94. See MICHAEL W. KIRST, GOVERNMENT WITHOUT PASSING LAWS (1969); Jason A.
MacDonald, Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions, 104 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 766 (2010). For example, approximately 300 limitation riders were written into
appropriations bills in the House of Representatives per year from 1993 to 2002, affecting agency
decisions from forbidding issuance of regulations to curtailing everyday decisions regarding statutory
implementation. MacDonald, supra, at 767-69.
95. MacDonald, supra note 94, at 767.
96. Teresa M. Schwartz, The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A FlawedProduct
of the Consumer Decade, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 32, 43 (1982). As earlier noted, the only distinction
between the CPSC and the SEC and CFTC concerns the removal power: the chair of the CPSC serves a
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all of the agencies in the study, it is the only one possessing all seven of the Datla
and Revesz criteria.
The CPSC's authorizing statute contained a novel regulatory procedure: a
public participation process for setting safety standards that provided what were
considered to be unprecedented legal rights (i.e., rights going beyond those
enumerated in the APA) to the public to petition the agency to create standards,
as well as to participate in the early stages of standard development through an
"offeror" process requiring the agency to solicit and use individuals outside of
the agency to develop initial drafts of a standard.9 But as fewer safety standards
were implemented in the agency's early years than had been anticipated, the
regulatory experiment was abandoned for hindering the adoption of standards,
and the novel public participation features were repealed in 1981, leaving the
agency's standard-setting subject solely to the APA.98 As the statistical analysis
uses relative, rather than absolute, counts of categories of agency action, it
controls for distortions in the comparison created by a potentially lower level of
overall activity due to impediments to policy implementation created by the
failed public participation experiment.
3. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
The CFTC was created as an independent commission i 1974, assuming
jurisdiction over derivative products previously regulated by a bureau within the
Department of Agriculture.99 Similar to the CPSC, the agency's regulatory
fixed term, and along with the CPSC commissioners can be removed by the president only for "neglect
of duty or malfeasance in office but for no other cause," 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (2018), in contrast to the
chairs of the SEC and CFTC, who explicitly serve at the pleasure of the president, with no statutory
language regarding removal for SEC and CFTC commissioners. While CPSC commissioners might
appear to have greater insulation than the CFPB director because "inefficiency" is not included as a reason
for removal in the CPSC's defining statute, Datla and Revesz persuasively maintain that variation in
statutory removal language has no practical impact. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 70, at 788.
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056(d) & 2059(e) (repealed 1981). After the offeror provided a draft,
the agency was then to finalize the standard in a conventional notice-and-comment procedure, along with
holding a hearing at which oral testimony could be received. As Schwartz describes, the CPSC was
authorized to hold public hearings and conduct investigations in response to petitions and required to act
on a petition within 120 days, plus to "promptly commence" proceedings to ban a product or develop a
safety standard upon granting a petition. If it denied a petition, a petitioner had the right to go to court and
the court was to consider the denial de novo, although the judicial review provision's applicability was
delayed for three years to permit the new Commission to establish priorities. Schwartz, supra note 96, at
45-46.
98. Id. at 35. For an explanation of the failure of the procedure from a political economy
perspective, see Moe, supra note 44.
99. The creation of an independent agency was opposed by farm interests and
Republican House members, who preferred to retain the agency within the cabinet. The Republican
minority lost on a party-line vote, at a time of divided government, an outcome consistent with the earlier
discussed political science literature indicating that independent agencies tend to be created in such a
political environment o strengthen congressional vis-d-vis presidential control. See Roberta Romano, The
Political Dynamics ofDerivative Securities Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 279,342-43 (1997). Although
the CPSC was also created in a period of divided government, its independent regulatory structure had
been the recommendation of a national commission established by congressional resolution in 1967. See
Schwartz, supra note 96, at 36.
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authority was altered over the two time intervals in which activity is examined
in this Article. Under its original statute, the CFTC had to approve all proposed
futures contracts and commodity exchange rules, and a few years after its
establishment, Congress further required the agency to employ a notice-and-
comment process, paralleling APA informal rulemaking, to approve all
commodity exchange rules that it deemed "economically significant."'0 0° These
requirements were repealed in 2000.101
There is a rather unusual distinction between the CFTC and other agencies
that would seem to render it potentially subject to greater congressional control.
It was established as a sunset agency, that is, it must be periodically reauthorized
to remain in operation. This feature puts it at the opposite end of the spectrum of
agency funding from the CFPB, with the SEC and CPSC somewhere in the
middle. The latter two agencies can be subjected to congressional discipline
through the appropriations process for regulatory activity Congress finds
objectionable, whereas the CFPB is free from any such potential control. The
CFTC, in contrast, has an additional hurdle of undergoing periodic
reauthorization, in which, at least in theory, there is a recurring possibility of
being shut down in the absence of an affirmative congressional vote on its
renewal.
Because funds are appropriated annually to non-sunsetting agencies such
as the SEC and CPSC, one could plausibly contend that there is scant distinction
between the politics of appropriations versus reauthorization. But while budget
reductions or periodic threats thereof can be expected in the scheme of things, a
move to zero appropriation for those agencies, which would be the budgetary
analogue to non-reauthorization, has never been contemplated by Congress.
Equally true, given its forty-plus years of operation, the possibility of eliminating
the CFTC seems as improbable as a zero appropriation for the SEC or CPSC.
0 2
Congressional deliberations on its reauthorization have, in fact, focused on
tweaking expansions or contractions of its authority, rather than its existence.1
0 3
Still, anticipation of upcoming reviews could, at the margin, provide the CFTC
with an incentive to be more responsive to Congress than are the other agencies.
Accordingly, if Congress prefers notice-and-comment rulemaking, as
implied by the McCubbins et al. framework, because it provides it with greater
100. 7 U.S.C. § 7a (12) (2006), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-405, § 12, 92 Stat. 870,
871 (1978) (repealed 2010).
101. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 110, 114
Stat. 2763A-384 (2000) (Appendix E). As discussed in Part III, the statistical analysis is run both with
and without the actions approving exchange rules and futures contracts that were adopted under the
requirements that were subsequently repealed, to retain consistency in the comparisons.
102. Although the CFTC's reauthorization has often been subjected to delay, with the
agency given temporary extensions while legislators negotiate revisions to its authorizing statute or have
more pressing matters on the agenda, abolishing the agency would appear never to have been seriously
considered. Romano, supra note 99.
103. See generally id (discussing CFTC reauthorizations from the 1970s through
1990s).
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leverage over an agency compared to other forms of policymaking, then
sunsetting should incentivize the CFTC to use that congressionally-favored
regulatory instrument more frequently than other agencies, particularly as
reauthorization approaches. Although the Article's data set does not consist of a
time series of sufficient length to investigate that intriguing timing issue, if being
subject to sunset has a significantly greater impact on an agency's independence
than being subject to annual appropriations, then we should observe a difference
in behavior between the CFTC and the other agencies. If, however, there is no
substantial difference regarding an agency's independence between being
subject to reauthorization or annual appropriations, then the CFTC would be
expected to behave no differently from the SEC and CPSC.
4. Securities and Exchange Commission
The SEC, a New Deal agency created in 1934, has no idiosyncratic features
regarding independence that deviate from the Datla and Revesz indicia, in
contrast to the CFPB and CFTC, and as earlier mentioned, lacks only one,
statutory removal protection (as is also true of the CFTC).10 4 The SEC has,
however, from early on been characterized as indistinguishable from
independent agencies with removal protections,10 5 and, as earlier noted,
commissioners are widely perceived to have removal protection by courts and
commentators.
5. Summing Up the Comparative Assessment of Agencies
The CFPB's distinctive absence, among the agencies under study, of a
multimember structure from the Datla and Revesz criteria of independence
makes possible identification of an impact on agency policymaking of a specific
structural characteristic of independence in the empirical analysis. However,
given the agency's other critical distinctive feature of being independent of the
appropriations process, the empirical analysis will not be able to isolate whether
a difference in behavior between the CFPB and the other agencies is due to the
divergence in leadership structure or funding, or a combination of the two. In
addition, if a more granular level of independence than that identified by
reference to the Datla and Revesz criteria affects an agency's choice of policy
104. The timing of the SEC's authorizing statute provides a possible explanation of the
somewhat puzzling absence of removal protection: it was enacted following a Supreme Court decision
holding that limitations on the president's removal power were unconstitutional, but prior to a subsequent
decision upholding for cause limits on the removal of independent agency commissioners. Note, The SEC
Is Not an Independent Agency, 126 HARv. L. REV. 781, 783, 785 (2013) (noting that the SEC was created
after Myers v. United States, which "appeared to hold that Congress could not limit the President's
removal power," but before Humphrey's Executor v. United States, which held that it could, and so it is
"unsurprising that [the statute] had nothing to say about removal").
105. Id. at 785 (citing 1940 treatise classifying the SEC in the same category as agencies
with removal protection, notwithstanding the SEC's authorizing statute's silence).
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tools, then we would expect, on a continuum of political insulation given the
differences between the CFTC, CPSC, and SEC, a progressive increase in the
use of less politically accountable nonlegislative rules moving from the CFTC
(which must be reauthorized) to the SEC and CPSC and then to the CFPB (the
most autonomous agency).
If, however, being subject to periodic reauthorization does not impact
administrators' behavior differentially from those who are subject to the
appropriations process, then the location on the continuum of activity for the
CFTC would approximate that of the SEC. By contrast, if multimember
leadership structure is more critical than other independence features, then we
would expect to find no discernible distinction in behavior among the three
bipartisan commissions the CPSC, SEC, and CFTC but a striking
differentiation between those agencies and the CFPB. Such a finding would also
hold if the sole factor affecting agency accountability was whether or not it was
subject to congressional appropriations.
III. Analysis of Agency Rulemaking
The regulatory activity analyzed in this Article is generated from a data set
consisting of 1,116 actions taken by the CFPB, CFTC, CPSC, and SEC. After
describing the data set's construction, summary statistics are presented.
Thereafter differences in type of regulatory activity across agencies and over
time are analyzed. The data are entirely consistent with the hypothesis that he
agency most insulated from Congress, the CFPB, uses the notice-and-comment
process significantly less frequently than the other agencies.
A. Data Set Construction and Summary Statistics
All rulemaking and guidance activity undertaken by the CFPB, CFTC,
CPSC, and SEC from the first month in which the CFPB took regulatory action,
April 2011, through May 2016, were identified by consulting the following
sources: agency websites and annual reports, the Federal Register, Unified
Agenda, and the Davis Polk Regulatory TrackerTM. Action by the CFTC and
CPSC was also collected from the earliest month of their regulatory activity,
April 1975 and June 1973, respectively, through May 1980 and July 1978,
respectively, intervals matching the number of months of CFPB activity in its
initial years of operation.
Enforcement actions are excluded from the analysis because of
measurement and tractability issues, even though they can be consequential as
agencies on occasion do undertake substantive policy initiatives through such
activity.10 6 The omission of enforcement activity is, however, mitigated by the
106. For instance, according to a study of SEC reporting of enforcement actions, year-
to-year data is not reliable: the practice of joining defendants in one action or bringing separate actions
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inclusion of all agency guidance documents, because significant policy
initiatives implemented through enforcement actions quite often work hand in
glove with issuance of guidance. Agencies can use such a combination of
instruments to facilitate compliance by specifying the parameters of appropriate
conduct. For instance, the illustrations in the Appendix of the CFPB's significant
policymaking through guidance were accompanied by enforcement ac ions,
although the temporal sequence can vary as to which regulatory initiative comes
first.
Documents for all identified regulatory activity were reviewed and
classified as rules or guidance following the description appearing in the Federal
Register or agency website (i.e., the agency's own characterization).10 7 Table 1
provides an overview of all identified activity by agency. Table 2 tallies the
subset of activity from Table 1 that is used in the analysis. Rules are divided into
two broad categories, those adopted by following the notice-and-comment
procedure and those that were not that is rules and other final action, such as
orders, that are effective upon publication without prior notice and solicitation
of comments.108
based on one investigation is inconsistently applied over time and across regional offices, and there is
double- or triple-counting (follow-on administrative actions imposing industry bars or registration
revocations are counted as well as the underlying federal court or administrative adjudication of liability).
Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC's Enforcement Statistics, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 901, 934-35 (2016). Quite apart from accuracy of counts, it would further not be
practicable to review the thousands of enforcement actions that were brought by agencies within the
sample periods in order to differentiate which ones should be included for possibly supplanting notice-
and-comment rulemaking by constituting new policy initiatives versus excluded as garden variety cases.
107. In a few instances an agency used multiple characterizations for a guidance action,
(e.g., an SEC document was identified as an interpretive release on one website page and as a concept
release on another); using one category or the other has no impact on the statistical analysis, however,
because, given small numbers in the guidance categories, it aggregates them into a single guidance
category. Where a single regulatory action consists of both a rule and a guidance component, it is classified
as a rule, so that statistical tests would be conservatively biased with regard to the relative use of rules
versus guidance. The unit of analysis is an agency action, which is more straightforwardly measured than
a possible alternative of each issue contained within an action as the unit. But as a check on whether
agencies vary dramatically, and systematically, in adopting few rules with many issues versus many
single-issue rules, differential patterns which could distort a comparison using actions as the analytical
unit, summaries of all documents for the CFPB, CFTC, and CPSC were read to gauge the number of
issues, and the vast majority contained only one, without appreciable divergence across agencies,
suggesting that i is improbable that the analysis is biased by using an action rather than issue count.
Namely, the percentage of significant actions as reported in Table 2 that relate to one issue is 90 percent
for the CFPB, 84 percent for the CFTC and 90 percent in its initial years, 79 percent for the CPSC and 80
percent in its initial years. The majority of notice-and-comment rules were also single-issue, and the
proportion similarly did not differ greatly across agencies in the post-Dodd-Frank period at 66 percent for
the CFPB, 67 percent for the CFTC and 75 percent for the CPSC, albeit variation was higher in the period
of initial operation for the CFTC at 93 percent and the CPSC at 75 percent.
108. CFTC approvals of exchange rules that, as earlier noted, were required to employ
a notice-and-comment process, are separately tallied in the tables and not included in the tally of notice-
and-comment rules, but they are counted as notice-and-comment rules in the statistical analysis. Proposed
rules are not included in the data set for two reasons. First, exclusion avoids what would otherwise result
in double counting notice-and-comment rules, once when proposed and comments are solicited and again
when the rule is finalized. Second, as some proposed rules are never adopted, it would be misleading to
include such proposals as they never had legal consequences.
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Non-notice-and-comment rules include both interim final rules and direct
final rules, which are the rules, along with notice-and-comment promulgations,
investigated by O'Connell in her study. The tables separately indicate the
number of actions in those two subgroups for comparative purposes with
O'Connell's analysis, but they are also included in the tables' tally of "non-
notice-and-comment" rules.10 9 Only the CPSC issued any direct final rules. The
infrequent use of such an instrument is consistent with O'Connell's observation
that "independent agencies [were] not the greatest users of direct final
rulemaking."110
The non-notice-and-comment rule category includes a diverse set of final
agency actions that are neither interim nor direct final rules. The most numerous
types of action in this category are CPSC orders approving third-party-devised
safety standards and revising third-party testing accreditations, and CFTC
approvals of futures contracts. Given the large number of such actions on the
CPSC and CFTC regulatory dockets, they are separately itemized in the tables,
but as with interim and direct final rules, they also are included in the tables'
tally of non-notice-and-comment rulemakings."'1
Agency guidance can be issued in many formats. The tables tally guidance
documents using an agency's own classification."2 While the tables provide
granularity with respect to the type of guidance document, no value-added is
109. As indicated in the tables, agencies sometimes solicited comments for interim rules
upon their adoption, but in nearly all instances, interim rules were left as is and many were never noticed
as implemented as final rules. The six CPSC rules that amended criteria for accepting third party
accreditation of testing product compliance with agency safety standards functioned administratively
similarly to interim rules in that they were effective immediately on publication, with comments olicited
ex post, and finalized without significant alteration.
110. O'Connell, supra note 56, at 933.
111. Although the CFTC, as earlier discussed, solicited public comments for all of the
futures contract proposals in advance of approval, this activity is not included in the notice-and-comment
rulemaking category because the agency was not required to use that process and hence had no obligation
to respond to comments, as it would have to do were it acting under the APA's notice-and-comment
procedure.
112. In the absence of a designation, guidance action is identified in the tables by its
substance (for example, CFTC release of internal reports). A limited number of guidance letters are
included in the data set: two CFTC letters that were published in the Federal Register and industry letters
are included which appeared on agency websites as staff guidance interpreting statutes or regulations.
Those letters were identified as policies on which regulated entities could rely but not as statements by
the commission and as subject to alteration at any time. No-action letters can on occasion affect a broad
class of entities and in such instances function more as significant regulatory initiatives than individual
relief See, e.g., Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action
Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921 (1998) (discussing SEC
use of no action letters); Hester Peirce, Regulating Through the Back Door at the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission 39-50 (Mercatus Working Paper, George Mason University, 2014) (discussing
CFTC use of no action letters). Nonetheless, no-action letters were excluded given both the infeasibility
of reviewing the multitude of no-action letters issued by the agencies in order to identify which would
have policy consequences, and the fact that a majority of no-action letters are directed at individual (non-
rule-like) requests, and therefore do not involve new policy initiatives. See Peirce, supra, at 42 (finding
that a rough count of CFTC no-action letters issued in 2013-14 suggests that one-third amended rules
temporarily or permanently to adjust requirements imposed by notice-and-comment rulemakings).
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gained by differentiation. 113 As indicated in the tables, agencies sometimes
solicit comments on guidance documents at the time of issuance, typically
explicitly noting that comments are not required under the APA (as they also do
when soliciting comments on what they determine to be APA-exempt legislative
rules). As with interim rules in which comments are sought ex post, such
guidance documents are rarely thereafter revised.
As indicated by comparing Tables 1 and 2, a sizeable proportion one-
third (237 of 717) of rules not subject to notice-and-comment consist of
nonsubstantive regulatory activity, such as technical corrections for spelling,
punctuation, or cross-reference mistakes in previously published rules,
extensions of effective dates, and rules related to an agency's internal
organization or procedures, which, as earlier noted, fall within the APA's notice-
and-comment exemptions."4 The tabulations in Table 2 eliminate these
housekeeping rules as they lack substantive policy content and would distort the
effort to investigate the use of alternative forms of regulatory activity to
implement substantive policy." 5 Similarly, the Table also excludes guidance
pronouncements deemed nonsubstantive (i.e., those merely summarizing an
existing rule and neither interpreting a rule nor announcing a new policy
initiative). As with exempt rules, an appreciable proportion of guidance falls into
this category (49 percent, or 195 of 399).
113. All guidance documents are combined into one guidance category in several
subsequent tables and figures and the statistical analysis, given the small numbers in individual categories
and idiosyncrasies in guidance classification across agencies (i.e., only the SEC issued guidance denoted
"concept releases"). Moreover, the key legal effect of guidance documents is identical regardless of their
classification: as mentioned earlier, all guidance is exempt from APA notice-and-comment requirements
and, as a general proposition, not subject to pre-enforcement judicial review, in contrast to rules. Hence,
there would be no value added to distinguish across forms of guidance in the analysis of agencies' activity.
114. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2018) (making notice-and-comment section not applicable
to matters relating to "agency management or personnel"). Rules that extend effective dates may well
significantly impact regulated entities, but they are excluded because they do not contain new policy
initiatives and inclusion could bias downward an agency's use of notice-and-comment, as extensions are
exempt rules that typically extend rules that were adopted by notice-and-comment. In addition, many
extensions, if included, would result in double-counting policy initiatives. For example, eleven of fifteen
rule extensions adopted by the SEC, which issued the most extensions, were continuances of extensions
of four rules.
115. Appendix Table Al maps the construction of Table 2 from Table 1. As indicated
in that table, the largest categories of nonsubstantive rules consist of technical corrections (97) and
amendments (47 rules). The most frequent technical amendment is a rule adjusting a statutory asset size
exemption threshold in accordance with changes in inflation. Two notice-and-comment rules are excluded
from Table 2 because they fit the definition of nonsubstantive rules applied to determine which non-
notice-and-comment rules to exclude: one, adopted by the CFTC in its initial years of operation, related
solely to internal agency practice; the other, adopted by the CFPB, was a technical amendment delaying
a rule's effective date. An action is included in Table 2 if there is any ambiguity about whether to classify
it as inconsequential. Elimination of nonsubstantive rules and guidance further puts agencies on a more
common footing for the analysis, as some nonsubstantive rules are agency-specific and their inclusion
would distort a comparative analysis. For instance, the SEC publishes as rules updates to its Edgar file
manual (which contains instructions for firms' submission of required informational filings
electronically); there is no analogue in the other agencies' regulations, and as indicated in Table Al, these
21 non-notice-and-comment rules comprise 16 percent of total SEC rulemakings.
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As Table 2 indicates, there are 684 agency actions, of which 480 (70
percent) are rules and 204 (30 percent) are guidance, which constitute the data
set used in the statistical analysis.116 Of the regulatory activity reported in the
table, 295 are rules adopted by notice-and-comment proceedings, which is a
substantial majority of aggregate rulemaking (about 61 percent), albeit less than
half (43 percent) of total regulatory activity.
Figures 1 and 2 present graphically the use of regulatory instrument by
agency, showing, respectively, the number and percentage of activity, by agency,
divided into three categories: notice-and-comment rules; all other rules (i.e.,
notice-and-comment-exempt rules, including interim and direct final rules, and
other non-notice-and-comment rule-like categories of final agency action); and
guidance (i.e., all nonlegislative action). As visual inspection suggests, the
proportion of notice-and-comment rulemaking varies markedly across agencies,
ranging from 29 percent (CFPB) to 58 percent (SEC and CPSC). These data
underscore the continued pertinence of O'Connell's observation that agencies
still "engage in a significant volume of notice-and-comment rulemaking,'' 
17
bolstering the suggestion in Yackee and Yackee's study that the ossification
objection to notice-and-comment rulemaking is overstated."18
The far greater use of notice-and-comment compared to interim rulemaking
by the agencies (with the CFPB being the notable outlier) is consonant with
O'Connell's further finding that only a small proportion of independent
agencies' rulemaking consists of interim final rules.119 Only the CFPB, at
approximately 35 percent of total rules, comes within the range of the proportion
of interim rules issued by the most frequent users of such a regulatory instrument
reported by O'Connell (a range of 34.2 to 49.4 percent), and even then it is at the
lower end.120 Somewhat more than half (15 of 25) of the CFPB's use of interim
final rules was to implement the transfer of regulatory authority from predecessor
agencies (i.e., those agencies' existing rules were adopted as interim final rules
by the CFPB, with little substantive change). Although the CPSC did not identify
the mechanism by which it transferred predecessors' egulations as interim final
rules, both agencies' rationale for those rules' being exempt from notice-and-
comment requirements was the same: the transferred regulations did not add new
116. If the CFTC's 39 exchange rule and futures contract approvals are excluded from
the analysis, given their origination in the private sector, in contrast to actions undertaken on the agency's
initiative, then the proportion of rules and guidance reported in the text is minimally impacted, shifting
to, respectively, 66 percent and 34 percent.
117. O'Connell, supra note 56, at 936.
118. Yackee & Yackee, supra note 19, at 279 (concluding study's findings "can be
viewed most generally as failing to support the ossification thesis, at least as to the vast bulk of rule-
making," being "largely disconfirming [of] ossification, or at least providing little evidence in support of
it").
119. O'Connell, supra note 56, at 935.
120. Id. at 934 (showing proportion of interim rules as a percentage of agency
rulemaking of the five most frequent users of interim rules).
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requirements and providing for notice and comment was therefore
"unnecessary" under the APA's "good cause" exemption.12 1
Table 3 shows the breakdown of agency activity by year, indicating as well
the activity agencies undertook in reference to a provision in Dodd-Frank.122 It
indicates that agency activity varies over time and that, for agencies subject to
Dodd-Frank (the CFPB, CFTC, and SEC), the bulk of their notice-and-comment
proceedings were concentrated on implementing that statute. Indeed, many of
their non-notice-and-comment rulemaking and guidance pronouncements also
were issued under Dodd-Frank provisions. As a proportion of an agency's
regulatory action over the post-Dodd-Frank period, 71 percent of CFPB activity,
75 percent of CFTC activity, and 56 percent of SEC activity referenced a
provision in Dodd-Frank as the statutory basis for the action. These data
underscore the extensive regulatory demands upon agencies generated by Dodd-
Frank.
Figure 3 plots regulatory activity in three categories (notice-and-comment
rule, non-notice-and-comment rule, and guidance) over time for each agency, for
the four agencies in aggregate in 2011 to 2016, and only notice-and-comment
rulemaking for all agencies separating out rules referencing Dodd-Frank and
those that do not. Although in the aggregate there would appear to be a
downward trend in notice-and-comment rulemaking, it is not consistently
declining across individual agencies. This is in contrast to a decline reported by
O'Connell from the 1990s to early 2000s.123 The difference in findings might be
121. For a CPSC example, see Procedures for the Development of Flammability
Standards & National Advisory Committee for the Flammable Fabrics Act, 39 Fed. Reg. 40,758, 40,759
(Nov. 20, 1974) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. §§ 1607, 1609 (1976)) ("Since no new requirements are added
by this revision and transfer, notice and public procedure are not prerequisites to this issuance.").
Regarding the CFPB, see Bur. Of Consumer Financial Protection, Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12
C.F.R. § 1026 (2012); Interim Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 79,767, 79,770 (Dec. 22, 2011) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2012)). The CFPB provided additional rationales, such as the transferred rules' having
originally been adopted by notice and comment. Id.
122. Three SEC rules and one CPSC rule in its years of initial operations were issued
in the month of December but were not published in the Federal Register until the following January;
Table 3 and Figure 3 classify those rules in the earlier year.
123. Despite the visual suggestion of a potential downward trend, as reported in Part
II.B, infra, there is not a statistically significant negative relation between year of adoption and use of
notice and comment. In an article focused solely on rulemaking during party transitions that extends the
data set of her earlier work, O'Connell confirms the earlier study's finding of less frequent rulemaking
activity in the initial year of a new administration and suggests as the explanation the considerable time
required for a new administration to staff an agency due to delays experienced in the nomination and
confirmation process. Anne Joseph O'Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 NW.
U. L. REV. 471, 495-97 (2011). The activity of the agencies under study in this Article would not appear
to comport with that finding. As indicated in Figure 3, there is a spurt in rulemaking by the CPSC in the
first year of the Carter presidency, whereas the CFTC's rulemaking, more consistent with O'Connell's
data, does not begin to increase substantially until he administration's second year. However, the sizeable
increase in CFTC activity in 1979 (the Carter administration's third year) is largely due to a 1978
amendment o the CFTC's authorizing statute which, as previously noted, required the agency to employ
notice and comment for approval of economically significant exchange rules (which account for fifteen
of the twenty-six notice-and-comment rules that year). There was also a larger number of proposed futures
contracts (eight) in 1979 than in other years. As both types of action originate in activity by the private-
sector (commodity exchanges), the increase in CFTC action would not, therefore, seem to be best
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an artifact of an uptick in notice-and-comment rulemaking due to Dodd-Frank
requirements: the non-Dodd-Frank rulemaking trend appears to decline a bit over
the interval (whether the rulemaking of the agency with no Dodd-Frank
requirements, the CPSC, is separately tracked or combined with the other three
agencies' non-Dodd Frank notice-and-comment rules), while notice-and-
comment rulemaking related to Dodd-Frank increases through 2013 and then,
although declining overall, blips slightly up in 2015. Of course, it is not self-
evident that one should predict from O'Connell's finding that notice-and-
comment rulemaking would continue to decline more than a decade later, rather
than stabilize at a lower level. I therefore hesitate to conclude that Dodd-Frank's
increased regulatory requirements explain differences in findings regarding a
time trend in informal rulemaking without additional years of observations.
B. Statistical Analysis
Crosstabulations were computed to assess, as a first cut, whether there is a
significant difference in agencies' use of notice-and-comment rules. As indicated
in Table 4, all permutations comparing agencies that include the CFPB indicate
that notice-and-comment activity is significantly different from what would
randomly be expected, whether the CFPB is compared to (i) all agencies,
including the CFTC and CPSC in both the post-Dodd-Frank period and their
initial years of operation; (ii) all agencies in the post Dodd-Frank time interval;
(iii) only agencies subject to Dodd-Frank in the post-Dodd-Frank period (i.e.,
SEC and CFTC); (iv) only the CFTC and CPSC in their years of initial
operations; and the first three comparisons but grouping all the non-CFPB
agencies together. Chi-square tests that compare observed to expected
frequencies of events (here, notice-and-comment rulemaking) reject the
hypothesis that the proportions are identical for all agencies.
But when the CFPB is removed from the crosstabulation, there is no
significant difference in use of notice and comment from what we would expect
to occur randomly (all chi-square tests are insignificant, indicating that he null
hypothesis of no difference in activity cannot be rejected). Accordingly, simple
univariate tests indicate that the CFPB uses notice-and-comment rulemaking
significantly less frequently than the other agencies under investigation.124 Of
course, these tests do not control for timing, which affected agency policymaking
explained as a function of the easing of staffing difficulties that had occurred in the beginning of a new
administration.
124. An asterisk in the table indicates whether the reported statistics are significant
when adjusted for the number of multiple comparisons. Applying a Bonferroni adjustment for nineteen
chi-square tests (the number of comparisons in the table), the appropriate confidence interval to retain a
global interval of .05 is .002632 (a chi-square value of 18.4526, computed by interpolating the values in
the chi-square distribution tables for .002 and .005). See, e.g., PAUL E. GREEN, ANALYZING
MULTIVARIATE DATA 221-23, 235 n.22 (1978) (calculating Bonferroni adjustment). As indicated, the
adjustment does not alter any statistically significant results in the table for the unadjusted crosstabulations
of notice-and-comment rulemaking and agency but would render insignificant several of the unadjusted
results of significance for the crosstabulations of notice-and-comment rulemaking and year.
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in O'Connell's study, and for which a multivariate analysis is required. But they
do suggest hat the previously discussed nuanced differences in agency structure
among the CFTC, SEC, and CPSC are not factors that affect an agency's choice
of rulemaking instrument, compared to the overarching distinctive structural
difference between those agencies and the CFPB (i.e., being subject to the
appropriations process or having a multimember leadership structure with a
bipartisan balance). Given a consistent finding that there is no significant
difference in the other agencies' notice-and-comment rulemaking as a group, and
intra-agency over time, their activity is aggregated in the multivariate analysis
that follows.
There is no systematic relation in the use of notice-and-comment
rulemaking over time. As indicated in Table 4, chi-square tests of
crosstabulations between year and notice-and-comment use are nearly all
insignificant. Consistent with visual inspection f the data in Figure 3, there is
no identifiable temporal pattern in notice-and-comment use in these data, in
contrast to that observed by O'Connell in her data set.
Table 5 presents results of maximum likelihood logit regressions of the
probability that a regulatory activity follows a notice-and-comment
proceeding.125 The explanatory variables include a CFPB indicator variable that
equals 1 if the adopting agency is the CFPB, and 0 otherwise; an indicator
variable for whether an agency referenced a provision of Dodd-Frank as the
statutory basis for the action; and year dummies for year of adoption, where year
1 is the omitted dummy variable and years are represented in "event" time as
years 1-6 to maintain the life-cycle comparison, given different years when
activity was undertaken by the CFTC and CPSC in their initial years of
operation. 126
125. The maximum likelihood logit regression estimates the function:
Pr(y 1) F (3o +tX,), where F(.) e2 / (1 + e2) is the cumulative logistic distribution. All statistical
analyses were conducted in Stata and estimated using Huber-White robust standard errors. Because, in
contrast to courts that are constrained by precedent, there is no constraint legally or otherwise on
agencies when adopting a new policy to follow past or concurrent regulatory strategies, the regulatory
actions are independent.
126. Because orders are considered adjudications and not rules, JOHN F. MANNING &
MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 707 (3d ed. 2017),
the regressions in the table were also run excluding orders. There is no change in significance, sign, or
magnitude of the results from those reported in the tables when orders are excluded from the analysis. In
addition, a substantial proportion (close to one-third) of rules adopted by the CFTC in its initial years of
operation were responses to private party activity (approval of futures contracts and exchange rules), and,
as earlier noted, the agency's required approval of those matters was eliminated a decade before the post-
Dodd-Frank period. Accordingly, the model in Table 5 in which the CFTC's activity in its years of initial
operation are included was also estimated, dropping observations for actions approving futures contracts
and exchange rules. In the reestimated regression either the sign nor significance of any of the
independent variables differ f om those reported in the table, and the coefficient magnitudes are similar.
For the four regulatory actions adopted in December but not published in the Federal Register until the
following January, see supra note 122, the reported regressions classify those observations in the earlier
year of agency approval, but all results are unchanged when the regressions are re-estimated using the
Federal Register publication year instead for those observations.
Vol. 36, 2019
Does Agency Structure Affect Agency Decisionmaking?
The model is run for all agencies in both time intervals (model 1), and then
only for agency activity taking place in 2011 to 2016 (i.e., excluding
observations from the initial years of operation of the CFTC and CPSC), to
eliminate noise in the estimation of the year variables arising from including
regulatory activity undertaken in a different environment (model 2). Finally, a
model is run excluding all CPSC activity and that of the CFTC in its initial years,
thereby including only activity of the three agencies subject to Dodd-Frank
rulemaking requirements in the post-Dodd-Frank interval (the CFPB, CFTC, and
SEC) (model 3). This latter model eliminates the possibility of a misleading
inference regarding the impact of Dodd-Frank that could be affected by the
presence of a number of observations on which it could have no influence (i.e.,
the regulatory activity of the CPSC or of the CFTC in its initial years).
As the table indicates, the statistical findings are not affected by which
model is estimated. All models fit well. In particular, the hypothesis that the
coefficient of all of the explanatory variables is zero, i.e., that the regression
model is insignificant, can be rejected (the likelihood ratio chi-squared statistics
are significant at less than one percent). Most important, notice-and-comment
regulatory activity is significantly negatively related to the adopting agency's
being the CFPB in all models.
127
Notice-and-comment rulemaking is also significantly positively related
with an action's referencing a provision in Dodd-Frank. But Dodd-Frank-related
activity is not the cause of the differential regulatory activity between the CFPB
and the other agencies: in regressions of the models in the table that omit all
activity referencing Dodd-Frank, the dummy variable for the CFPB is still
significantly negative at less than one percent in the samples of models 1 and 2
and less than two percent in the sample of model 3. Dodd-Frank regulatory
requirements are therefore not driving the results. Accordingly, the analysis is
consistent with the hypothesis that agency design matters. More specifically, it
is consistent with the hypothesis motivating this Article's inquiry, that the more
insulated an agency is from political accountability, the less likely it is to employ
notice-and-comment rulemaking to implement its mission.128
The regressor coefficients of the best-performing model of the three models
in Table 5 (i.e., model 3, which has the highest percentage of correct
127. All three models were also estimated clustering the observations by agency and
the results are unchanged: the CFPB indicator is significantly negative and the Dodd-Frank indicator
significantly positive, both at less than one percent, while the year dummies are insignificant.
128. Because there was no bureau director until January 2012, when President Obama
made a recess appointment, and Dodd-Frank limited the agency's ability to regulate nonbanks in the
absence of the initial appointment of a director, see, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE
EARLY AGENDA OF THE CFPB: THE NONBANK SUPERVISION PROGRAM 3-4 (2012), the three regression
models in Table 5 were reestimated omitting the 2011 observations (in parallel omitting 1975 observations
for the CFTC and 1973 observations for the CPSC in model 1), to eliminate the possibility that the CFPB's
lower likelihood of using notice-and-comment rulemaking is due to reticence to act in the absence of a
director. But, that is not an explanation for the observed significant difference regarding rulemaking: the
sign and significance of the independent variables are unchanged in all three models when the earlier
months' activity is omitted.
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classifications and best goodness-of-fit of the first three models and is estimated
only on actions by agencies subject to Dodd-Frank, the CFPB, CFTC, and SEC
in the post-Dodd-Frank interval) can be transformed into odds ratios. The ratios
indicate how much more likely an action will be a notice-and-comment rule
when it has the characteristic of the specific independent variable, holding all
other variables constant. The transformation into odds ratios therefore provides
interpretive content to the statistical significance of the variables that is easier to
appreciate. The ratio for the CFPB indicator variable is .2826 and for the Dodd-
Frank indicator variable, 7.0852. The odds are, therefore, 28 percent less likely
for an action to be a notice-and-comment rule if the agency is the CFPB, holding
everything else constant. In addition, the odds are over seven times more likely
that an action is a notice-and-comment rule if the subject matter relates to Dodd-
Frank, holding all else constant. The odds ratio computation provides a striking,
as well as more readily comprehensible, indication of how anomalous the
CFPB's mode of decisionmaking has been.
An alternative, seemingly plausible interpretation of the findings could
relate to agency expertise. An agency could be less likely to employ notice-and-
comment rulemaking when it is resource rich, on the view that an agency lacking
sufficient resources to obtain information on its own regarding appropriate
policy would find public input provided by notice-and-comment essential to do
its work. This hypothesis is not, however, supported by the data. Table 5 also
reports the results of the first three regression models reestimated (models 4, 5,
and 6) to include a per capita resources variable. The resources per capita
variable is constructed by dividing an agency's budget in millions of dollars by
the number of agency employees.129 As the table indicates, the available
resources per capita variable is insignificant when the CPSC is included (models
4 and 5) but significantly positive when the CPSC is excluded (model 6), while
the CFPB and Dodd-Frank indicator variables remain significantly negative and
positive, respectively.130 Controlling for resources does not alter the finding that
the CFPB uses notice and comment significantly less frequently than the other
agencies. Hence, contrary to the internal information hypothesis as the
129. The agencies' number of employees were obtained from the U.S. Office of
Personnel Management (the 2010s data are available online, Federal Human Resources Data, U.S.
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., https://www.fedscope.opm.gov/ [https://perma.cc/AX9G-4NQ5], while
the 1970s data were obtained directly from the agency). As the 1970s data were available only as of
September, for consistency, that is the data used for all agencies over all time intervals. But models 5 and
6 were also estimated using year-end employee data and the results are unchanged. Data on agency
budgets identified as Fed transfers for the CFPB and appropriations for the other agencies were
obtained and confirmed from multiple sources: enacted appropriations tatutes, agency websites, and
appendix volumes of the Office of Management and Budget's annual volumes on the U.S. government
budget. The SEC has by far the largest budget, compared to the other agencies. At well over a billion
dollars, it is ten times greater than the lowest budget in the same time interval, the CPSC's, which is not
much above $100 million. But as the agencies with the greater budgets also have much larger staff, per
capita resources are not as variable as the raw dollar amounts. Appendix Table A2 provides the agencies'
budgets and number of employees.
130. These results are the same if the budget amounts are used instead of the per capita
amounts. If the number of employees is used instead, it is insignificant in all three regression models.
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explanation of the findings of the first three regression models reported in Table
5, we can conclude that an agency's having greater available resources does not
substitute for use of notice-and-comment rulemaking but rather, if there is a
relationship, it is apparently the precise opposite, leading to more frequent use
of such a procedure.
There is no systematic association between year and adoption of notice-
and-comment rules (i.e., only one year indicator variable is significant in one
model).13 1 The effect of year 1 is included in the constant term, which is
significantly negative, indicating that as the baseline case, year 1 has fewer
notice-and-comment rulings than other years, but there is no further evidence of
a declining or increasing trend in the adoption of notice-and-comment rules.
As a robustness check, the three regressions were rerun using one year variable
with the values 1-6 identifying the year of the action's adoption and with values
equal to the actual year of adoption. Both of these alternative specifications of
the year variable were insignificant in all three models, supporting the inference
that there is no time trend in notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Finally, there is a question whether Dodd-Frank's imposition of numerous
deadlines on regulatory mandates could explain the CFPB's less frequent
recourse to notice-and-comment rulemaking rather than its more politically
insulated structure. Gersen and O'Connell, for instance, find that there is a
statistically significant higher percentage of interim final rules among rules with
deadlines than without (12 percent compared to 8 percent), although they do not
report whether there is a significant effect of deadlines on notice-and-comment
rules.132 An inference from their analysis is that deadlines could encourage an
agency to favor rulemaking that avoids the notice-and-comment process, as that
would facilitate more expeditious implementation of mandated policy to meet a
deadline. As the CFPB was not the only agency subject to Dodd-Frank deadline
requirements, there is a comparative benchmark against which to assess whether
urgency to meet deadlines, and not structural independence, explains its
anomalous behavior.
Attempting to meet Dodd-Frank deadlines does not explain the difference
in the CFPB's behavior regarding use of notice-and-comment rulemaking from
the other agencies. Dodd-Frank imposed markedly fewer rulemaking deadlines
on the CFPB than on either the CFTC or SEC, with statutory directives imposing
mandated rulemaking with deadlines of 16, 41, and 69, respectively.133 Table 6
tallies agencies' rulemaking activity associated with Dodd-Frank deadlines. Not
131. Moreover, tests of whether the coefficients were not the same for all of the year
dummies were insignificant for all three models, indicating that the hypothesis that notice-and-comment
activity was not significantly different across time cannot be rejected.
132. Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 923, 943 (2008). They examine rulemaking from 1987 to 2003, in which the bulk of the
data set consists of rules issued by executive branch agencies.
133. The Davis Polk Regulatory TrackerT
M 
was used to identify the Dodd-Frank
provisions requiring rulemaking with statutory deadlines for each agency.
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only does it indicate that agencies with greater notice-and-comment activity had
more statutory deadlines to meet, but it also indicates that the vast majority of
statutory directives requiring deadlines were met with notice-and-comment
rulemaking, a finding at odds with Gersen and O'Connell's analysis.
As a test of whether the CFPB dealt with the statutory burden differently
from other agencies, model 3 was reestimated to include an interaction term
between the Dodd-Frank and CFPB indicator variables to capture any such
divergence. The interaction term was, however, insignificant, while the effect of
the separate indicator variables for the CFPB and Dodd-Frank were
unchanged they are still significantly negative and positive, respectively. This
finding is consistent with the demands of Dodd-Frank not being the explanation
of the CFPB's anomalous regulatory behavior.
As Table 6 indicates, agencies adopted multiple rules under Dodd-Frank
provisions with a deadline, and some rules related to multiple deadline
provisions. Model 3 of Table 5 (the model with only actions by agencies affected
by Dodd-Frank) was re-estimated with a deadline indicator variable equaling 1
for any rule that was identified as implementing a provision in Dodd-Frank that
imposed a deadline on the required rulemaking, and then with a "first" deadline
indicator variable equaling 1 only for the first rule issued under such a provision.
In their respective regressions, both deadline variables were significantly
positively related to notice-and-comment rulemaking (at less than one percent),
while the significance of the other variables in the reported regressions without
deadline variables was not affected.
To investigate further whether the CFPB was differentially affected by
deadlines, interaction variables between each of the deadline variables and the
CFPB dummy were constructed. Neither interacted variable was significant.
Accordingly, the hypothesis that the CFPB's significantly lower probability of
using notice-and-comment rulemaking compared to other agencies is a function
of urgency for meeting statutory deadlines can be rejected. This finding provides
further support for the most plausible and parsimonious explanation of the
CFPB's distinctive regulatory behavior being a function of difference in
administrative structure, its lack of multimember leadership, and independent
source of funding.
IV. Implications for Agency Design
The key empirical finding that the agency structured to be the most
independent from political accountability engaged significantly less frequently
in notice-and-comment rulemaking than three other cognate, albeit less
politically insulated, agencies is altogether consistent with an extension of the
McCubbins et al. insight regarding the import of administrative law, that agency
structure can reduce the efficacy of congressional oversight by facilitating
avoidance of notice-and-comment rulemaking. Of course, this is not to say that
for any specific policy issue a wide variety of considerations do not influence an
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agency's choice of regulatory instrument.134 The contention informed by the
empirical analysis is that, at the margin, an agency that is more independent will
be more apt to engage in less-constrained policy formulation (i.e., forgoing use
of notice-and-comment rulemaking) because in such a context it can suffer fewer
adverse consequences from engaging in that behavior. After all, notice-and-
comment rulemaking requires greater effort, as it is cumbersome and time-
consuming from an agency's perspective, and a leadership that is confident in its
policy judgments and largely unchecked by political constraints can minimize
its use. This section analyzes the implications of this Article's core finding
regarding the CFPB's discrepant use of notice-and-comment rules, initially for
the ongoing controversy over the CFPB's structure, and then more broadly, albeit
more briefly, for reform proposals regarding agencies' use of notice-and-
comment rulemaking and the literature on agency design and administrative law
more generally.
A. Organization of the CFPB
A rationale often invoked for rejecting legislative proposals to restructure
the CFPB along more conventional lines is that the agency is doing just fine
because it "has produced a relatively small number of major new rules through
a deliberate process.'' 135 This explanation is quite misleading. The problem with
such an assessment is that it misperceives the legal landscape. As the statistical
analysis demonstrates and as the case studies in the Appendix illustrate, the
CFPB has employed much more frequently than other independent agencies
guidance and exempt rules, instruments far from the deliberation that is either
explicitly or implicitly being lauded. Only 25 percent of the CFPB's significant
regulatory activity was effected by a notice-and-comment rule (compared to 58
percent by the SEC, 50 percent by the CFTC and 43 percent in its years of initial
operations, and 58 percent by the CPSC and 48 percent in its years of initial
operation). Another metric evidencing the CFPB's anomalous behavior is that
the odds that a regulatory action is undertaken by notice-and-comment
rulemaking are 28 percent lower if the agency is the CFPB rather than the other
agencies, all else held constant. In a nutshell, the data indicate that the quality of
the CFPB's decisionmaking, and hence the appropriateness of its current
organization, could not be accurately assessed by referencing only its notice-and-
comment rulemaking because that is simply not the sole, or even major, arena in
which the agency's regulatory initiatives are taking place, as illustrated by the
case studies in the Appendix.
134. See E. Donald. Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490 (1992).
135. Ingo Walter, Rebalancing Consumer Protection in the Trump Era, in REGULATING
WALL STREET: CHOICE ACT VS. DODD-FRANK 161 (Matthew P. Richardson et al. eds., 2017) (quoting
approvingly Harvard economist John Y. Campbell, Consumer Financial Protection: In Need of
Protection, ECONOFACT (Feb. 23, 2017), https:Heconofact.org/consumer-financial-protection-in-need-of-
protection [https://perma.cc/E378-C7PM]).
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1. Putting the Republican Opposition to the CFPB's Structure in Context
From the outset, following a party-line vote on the Dodd-Frank legislation
in which the CFPB was established, its anomalous independent structure has
been an ongoing point of contention, with bills regularly introduced by
Republicans to reorganize the agency more conventionally and thereby subj ect
it to greater political accountability.136 The continuing effort by opponents of the
CFPB to restructure the agency is a tame version of a pattern in U.S. political
history: agency terminations upon changes in administration have been quite
common occurrences.
137
The Republican Party's opposition is, no doubt, informed by the agency's
regulatory mission, which could financially burden important constituents in
their political coalition, and the theoretical and statistical analysis suggests that
Republican efforts to restructure the agency along conventional independent
commission lines would have real bite. Not surprisingly, the bulk of the
Republican bills would have transformed the CFPB into a multimember,
bipartisan-balanced commission subject to the appropriations process. Such a
reorganization would have the effect of rendering the CFPB more attentive to
congressional preferences, which would include, of course, Republican
preferences.
But in June 2017, the Republican House took a different reformatory tack,
passing a bill that would reorganize the CFPB more along the lines of an
executive branch agency, by retaining the single-director structure but
eliminating the position's statutory removal protection and, as included in the
earlier bills, subjecting the agency to appropriations.38 It is more than a
136. For a summary of eleven Republican proposals introduced in the 113th Congress
(the penultimate session under the Obama administration) proposing a restructuring of the CFPB to
increase congressional oversight offered under divided government, see Andrew J. Buczek & Haydn J.
Richards, Jr., House Financial Services Subcommittee Holds Legislative Hearing on CFPB Proposals,
LEXOLOGY (May 27, 2014), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g dbcf7l96-d051-4445-
b0b5-153b85d5e39d [https://perma.cc/7RV8-XXYX]. In the newly formed 115th Congress commenced
in January 2017, five bills were introduced to restructure, or eliminate the agency in the session's first two
months. See CFPB Accountability Act, S. 387, 115th Cong. (2017) (subjecting CFPB to the regular
appropriations process); Repeal CFPB Act, S. 370, 115th Cong. (2017) (eliminating CFPB by repealing
statute creating it); H.R. 1031, 115th Cong. (2017) (same); Consumer Financial Protection Board Act, S.
105, 115th Cong. (2017) (reorganizing agency into bipartisan commission); H.R. 1018, 115th Cong.
(2017) (same).
137. As Lewis observes, "Administrative agencies never escape the politics that created
them. Coalitions that formed to create a new agency attempt to protect and oversee the new agency over
time. The political opponents of a new agency, however, having failed to prevent the agency's creation,
try to destroy it if they have the opportunity. History is replete with examples." LEWIS, supra note 44, at
142 (citations omitted). Lewis analyzes the durability of all 437 agencies created from 1946 to 1997, 60
percent of which were terminated. Id. at 142, 156. In a statistical analysis of agency termination, he finds
that the probability of an agency created under unified government being terminated when there is a
change to unified government of the other party is 240 percent higher than if no party change had occurred.
Id. at 156. The advent of a new president of a different party from his predecessor increases the probability
of an agency's termination by approximately 39 percent. Id.
138. Financial CHOICE Act, H.R. 10 § 711, 712, 115th Cong. (2017). The acting
director of the agency has endorsed the Act's proposed alteration of its structure to be more accountable
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coincidence that the shift in position occurred when a Republican had assumed
the presidency and there was no longer divided government. The notable change
in Republican approach is consistent with the political science finding mentioned
earlier, that agencies created during spells of divided government are more likely
to be independent commissions, while those created in periods of unified
government are more likely to be located within the executive branch. 1
39
From the perspective of congressional exercise of control over agencies,
the reformulated Republican approach would keep the CFPB politically
accountable to Congress through its appropriations authority, albeit with greater
control in the president by virtue of his ability to remove the director, than to
Congress, when contrasted with a multimember, bipartisan commission.
Whatever the substantive merit of the Republican Party's shift in preferred
organization when contrasted to a commission structure, the key fact is that, had
the bill been enacted, compared to the present arrangement, the agency would
have been rendered more accountable to elected officeholders.
2. Why Accountability and Performance Could Improve with a More
Conventional Structure
If the CFPB had the more conventional structure of a multimember
commission subject to the appropriations process, then given the empirical
findings regarding how such agencies tend to behave, Congress would have
available more effective tools for gathering information regarding CFPB policy
initiatives and for disciplining it were it to disapprove of the agency's activity.
For instance, as regulatory activity could be expected to follow a notice-and-
comment process more frequently, Congress would be less likely to have to
undertake time-consuming investigations, in which internal documents have to
be pried from an agency well after an initiative's implementation in order to gain
an appreciation of what would appear to be an errant policy from Congress's
perspective, as was the situation with the CFPB's initiative on automobile dealer
by subjecting it to the appropriations process and to greater control by the president. Messagefrom Mick
Mulvaney, Acting Director, in SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION 1, 1-2 (Apr. 2018), https:Hfiles.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb semi-annual-
report spring-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SKR-BGUE].
139. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. It might also have been influenced
by a federal appellate court decision remedying its finding that the CFPB's structure was unconstitutional
by holding that the director's post must be subject to removal at will by the president, although that holding
was subsequently reversed by an en bane decision. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d
1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded, PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C.
Cir. 2018) (en banc). More recently, a federal district court in another circuit held the agency
unconstitutional, adopting, without discussion, the opinion of the dissenters in the D.C. Circuit's en bane
decision, but it had no effect on the defendant company because, while dismissing the CFPB as a party,
the New York State Attorney General was permitted to pursue the litigation. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau
v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, No. 17-cv-890, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104132, at *5,102-06 (S.D.N.Y. June
21,2018).
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loans discussed in the Appendix.140 While the acting director has not engaged in
similar behavior to that of his predecessor, suggesting that would not be a present
concern, without agency reorganization, there is always the possibility, if not
likelihood, of reversion to past regulatory practice with a change in leadership.
More important, short-circuiting notice-and-comment rulemaking
attenuates public participation in rulemaking and the public's ability to challenge
a rule in court. This has a negative impact on Congress's capacity to engage in
agency oversight for two reasons. First, Congress receives considerably less
information concerning the reasoning for an agency initiative when it is not
undertaken through notice and comment as there is no public record of agency
decisionmaking detailing public reaction and agency responses. Second, given
the reduced ability of members of the public to participate in the rulemaking
process or to seek legal redress, constituents will not be as readily able to pull
fire alarms,14 1 notifying legislators that something is amiss in the regulatory
process and pointing out perceived pitfalls in a rulemaking. Accordingly, a
change in CFPB structure that would increase its use of the notice-and-comment
process would have a beneficial impact on Congress's capacity to monitor the
agency.
Moreover, when a multimember commission engages in notice-and-
comment rulemaking, the agency should be able to craft a more durable policy
than a single director. 42 Information generated from a broad range of
constituents, indicating what features of a proposed rule might be problematic
from their perspective and how those issues could satisfactorily be addressed,
would be filtered through commissioners' multiple viewpoints and not just that
of a single individual whose perspective and experience are inherently more
limited. As a consequence of the partisan balance requirements for commissions,
it is far more probable that a well-recognized benefit of group decisionmaking,
reduction in errors ofjudgment from the evaluation and combination of divergent
views, will come into play than the equally well-recognized potential cost, the
aggravation of errors from a "groupthink" dynamic where diversity of
140. An intensive congressional investigation in the future under the current
organizational setup might not provide much information, however, as CFPB staff, aware that an
adversarial Congress could obtain and publicly release embarrassing internal memoranda, could respond
by avoiding providing the director with candid written assessments so as not to leave a problematic paper
or electronic trail.
141. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SC. 165 (1984) (describing how Congress
exercises fire-alarm oversight of agencies through setting up administrative procedures that citizens and
interest groups can use i.e., pull a fire alarm to inform Congress of perceived regulatory problems).
142. In offering design principles for an agency fully insulated from political branches
in day-to-day operations, as is the CFPB, Paul Tucker advocates a multimember decisionmaking structure,
pointing out, in criticism of the CFPB's failure to meet that criterion, presciently given this Article's
findings, that the "single-policy-maker structure" is not likely to "ensure that a steady course is maintained
through different political administrations." TUCKER, supra note 92, at 313.
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viewpoints and independent thought is absent.'43 As earlier noted, partisan
balance requirements are consequential, resulting in appointment of
commissioners with inherently diverse viewpoints.'44 Accordingly, rules so
produced should not only be of higher quality but also should be more politically
acceptable by regulated entities as well as the broader public.
Relatedly, multimember commissions have an incentive to seek consensus
because that adds value to a policy initiative: although courts generally tend to
defer to agency decisions, a nonunanimous rule will have a lower likelihood of
being upheld by a court than a unanimous rule. That is because dissents
accompanying a nonunanimous and contentious rule can communicate
information regarding the quality of a decision, such as highlighting a failure to
address significant issues identified by public comments, and thereby buttress a
litigant's challenge to a rule.145 By contrast, such information would be absent
for a court reviewing a policy adopted by means of compromise and consensus.
Moreover, a rule adopted under a bipartisan consensus informed by a broad array
of public comments regarding the proposal would be less subject to challenge in
court in the first place, as it would be more readily accepted by both regulated
entities and the public at large.
The potential benefit of consensus on judicial review should similarly
impact legislative review. Bipartisan agreement on a commission could, for
instance, lead Congress to feel less need to engage in extensive monitoring, such
as holding high-visibility hearings, as constituents should be less likely to pull
fire alarms. Such an outcome, in turn, would have a positive feedback effect on
the agency, as hearing preparation and appearances are time-consuming and can
distract an agency's leadership, diminishing the effectiveness of the agency's
ongoing activities. The positive signals that consensus-based rulemaking provide
143. See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004) (discussing the
literature on group decisionmaking). Sunstein and Hastie analyze the quality of group decisionmaking,
providing the conditions, along with numerous examples, under which group decisions can and do go
wrong. CASS R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO MAKE GROUPS
SMARTER (2015). Nonetheless, they do not suggest that decisionmaking by an individual the CFPB
structure would generally do better than that by a group, and many of the problems they identify occur
in groups whose members are homogeneous or those whose majorities suppress minority views,
improbable scenarios for a bipartisan commission setting where the group inherently has diverse
perspectives. That isbecause diversity is a necessary condition, or as they put it, of"immense importance,"
for improving the quality of group decisions and avoiding the potential pitfalls of groupthink. Id. at 104.
For an additional justification for regulatory decisions to be made by committees and not by a single
individual with respect to agencies where a need for credible commitment requires independence from
political authorities, such as central banks, see TUCKER, supra note 92, at 106-07. His contention is that
with a single decisionmaker, it is "too easy" to appoint a political ally, an individual with preferences
matching those of the political appointer, rather than the societal preference, such as, to avoid time
inconsistency, that is the rationale for agency independence in a credible commitment regulatory context.
144. See Feinstein & Hemel, supra note 46.
145. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(referring to commissioners' dissents in one of its reasons for striking down an SEC rule). For a discussion
of the importance of a multimember commission to reach a compromise and the damaging effect of
dissents onjudicial review of a rule, see Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 289 (2013).
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to courts, legislators, and the public that policy has been formulated with care
through bipartisan deliberation and compromise cannot, of course, arise when it
is set by a single decisionmaker.
In sum, notice-and-comment rulemaking provides an agency with valuable
information from members of the public and interest groups providing comments
from diverse perspectives and with practical experience related to issues under
consideration, improving the quality of decisionmaking as well as increasing a
policy's acceptance by the citizenry, and particularly by regulated entities. An
agency is forewarned of the concerns of those who would be affected by a rule
and can thereby adapt it, if warranted, to facilitate the rule's acceptance and
thereby ensure effective implementation and enforcement.146 Does such a
scenario imply that regulators are captured by the regulated industry? To the
contrary, studies of notice-and-comment rulemaking find that, while industry is
typically the source of most comments (or if fewer in absolute number, then it
provides the most technically and substantively informed comments),
particularly in the pre-proposal stage which could aid in shaping a rule that is
advanced for formal comment, investigations of this issue have not concluded
that industry dominates regulatory outcomes.147 Because there is less
transparency in non-notice-and-comment rulemaking, those modes of regulation
would quite plausibly be more susceptible to regulatory capture than the notice-
and-comment process, as they do not create a public record of interest groups'
input that can be monitored as easily by organizations with widely diverging
perspectives or as effectively evaluated by courts.
An administrative design that encourages the use of an open and transparent
process that is the essence of notice-and-comment rulemaking would, in my
judgment, be especially desirable in politically contentious times by reassuring
citizens that high quality policy decisions will be generated following
consideration of multiple viewpoints. Of course, not all regulatory actions
require an elaborate process, and in times of exigencies, a more rapid response
is necessary, which is the function of interim rules. But in the context of
significant policy initiatives, following a notice-and-comment procedure should
be deemed the gold standard of administration, as it inherently produces
decisions of higher quality and with greater democratic accountability, and hence
legitimacy, than other regulatory instruments.
146. KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 11, at 168-69.
147. See id. at 212 (summarizing small number of studies on this issue, which focus on
EPA rulemaking, and concluding "no easy generalization" can be made regarding industry influence);
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don't "'Screw Joe the Plummer": The Sausage-Making of Financial Reform, 55
ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 82-84 (2013) (analyzing preproposal stage agency contacts and comments on the
Volcker rule and, despite providing evidence of the banking industry's more informative technical
comments, not concluding there was capture, given a small number of important, informed
"countervailing voices" also weighed in).
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3. Why Would Congress Adopt a Structure which It Cannot Control?
A seeming puzzle follows from what has been asserted regarding the
superiority of multimember commissions: why would legislators voluntarily
limit their ability to influence an agency's policymaking? Did Congress just get
what it was seeking in the CFPB's anomalous regulatory decisionmaking? In a
superficial sense, the answer is yes. After all, one Congress chose to establish
such a structure. But the congressional majority's expectation regarding the
impact of its administrative design for the CFPB on regulatory behavior is, at
best, obscure.
For instance, the organization of the CFPB swung back and forth
throughout the legislative process from an individual director to a multimember
structure, suggesting legislators' uncertainty and disagreement regarding the
optimal design and its rationale. The original House bill created an agency led
by a single director with an oversight board consisting of the leaders of other
agencies, but it was modified in committee to a commission structure. This
structure was, in turn, further modified on the floor to begin with a single director
and convert into a five-member commission with partisan balance within two
years of the transfer of regulatory authority from existing agencies to the new
one. 148
The Senate bill that replaced the House bill and was approved in
conference, however, reverted back to a single director format. Although there
was some discussion of agency structure in a House committee hearing and on
the floor during deliberations on Dodd-Frank, the official legislative history (i.e.,
House, Senate, and Conference committee reports) does not make any reference
to a rationale for the final agreed-upon structure. The Senate report did reference
the rationale for the agency's anomalous funding, as a need to respond to what
it considered the cause of ineffectiveness of OFHEO, the Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight, which regulated the government-sponsored
entities ("GSEs") securitizing mortgages: "repeated Congressional pressure" in
the appropriations process.149 But as earlier noted, an analogy between the
OFHEO and CFPB is mistaken, as the CFPB could not possibly experience the
political pressure brought to bear on OFHEO as it has no connection whatsoever
to the GSEs that OFHEO regulated, and that were completely, and arguably
corruptly, tied into Congress through munificent campaign contributions and
constituent support by community organizers and activists.1
5 0
148. H.R. 4173, 11 1th Cong. §§ 4101-03 (2009) (as introduced in the House); Brief for
Current and Former Members of Congress as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 18-19, PHH Corp.
v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) [hereinafter Brief]. The change
was explained as a compromise between the original bill and the House Energy and Commerce
Committee's amendment o a commission structure when considering the bill. Id.
149. S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 163 (2010).
150. See supra note 87 (noting the comparison between the OFHEO and CFPB). For a
primer on the munificent campaign contributions, political connections, national publicity campaigns, and
intense lobbying of Congress by the GSEs, see GRETCHEN MORGENSON & JOSHUA ROSNER, RECKLESS
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Democratic members of Congress have subsequently advanced two
rationales for the CFPB's setup in a brief filed in response to litigation over the
constitutionality of the agency's structure. They assert hat they chose a single
director over a multimember commission for "speed and decisiveness" of
regulatory action and to avoid regulatory capture. 151 The latter contention can be
readily dismissed: there is absolutely no evidence that a multimember agency is
more prone to capture than a single individual-led agency. Quite to the contrary,
the opposite contention is far more plausible: it is easier to capture one individual
than a multimember entity, where interest groups must not only coopt more
individuals to succeed, but also individuals of sharply differing ideological
persuasions. Moreover, this characterization is informed by more than a simple
appeal to intuition: partisan balance requirements, as earlier noted, have been
found to have a significant impact, resulting in appointment of commissioners
with highly diverse viewpoints, and do not function as mere window dressing by
which presidents appoint members of the opposition party whose positions are
closest to those of their own party.
152
The other rationale in the Democrats' brief in support of the CFPB's
constitutionality, speed in implementation, is, on the surface, a plausible
explanation.53 The Democratic Party leadership, no doubt, made a calculation
that a single director could more quickly implement the party's agenda during
the agency's formative years, as there would be no need to achieve consensus
among diverse commissioners, and thereby would rectify what it perceived to be
a source of failure contributing to the global financial crisis. From that point of
view, the agency design would ensure that the determination of initial policies
would be formulated solely by an individual who shared their understanding of
what needed to be accomplished. But while the choice of organization is, of
course, intentional, the consequence of the choice regarding the instruments by
which the agency's policies are implemented was, in all likelihood, altogether
not anticipated.
Namely, there is no reason to assume that Democrats intended that the
agency's anomalous structure would result in its conducting a large proportion
of its regulatory initiatives as guidance rather than through notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Not surprisingly, there is, for instance, nothing in the legislative
record expressing even an inkling regarding how such an agency would
implement its policy initiatives, which could have provided the only pertinent
wisps from which to glean state of mind with regard to the counterfactual. Just
as a number of commentators today misperceive the legal landscape and impact
ENDANGERMENT: How OUTSIZED AMBITION, GREED, AND CORRUPTION LED TO ECONOMIC
ARMAGEDDON 68-71 (2011).
151. Brief, supranote 148, at 13, 19.
152. Feinstein & Hemel, supra note 46; Ho, supra note 46.
153. Brief, supra note 148, at 16, 20.
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of the CFPB's structure when lauding its rules, elected officials did not fully
appreciate the consequences of the organizational structure that they had devised.
A key objective for the Democratic majority in establishing a single-
director agency was, no doubt, to create an agency that would rapidly and
durably implement their policy agenda, which would thereby survive a possible
turnover in party control of Congress or the presidency. Indeed, achieving that
objective was apparently perceived to be so critical that the Democratic majority
was willing to tie its hands by forfeiting the ability to exercise control over the
agency through the appropriations process and partisan balance requirements to
prevent presidents from filling a commission with only individuals of their
viewpoint. But quite ironically, the plan boomeranged: by the CFPB's having
resorted less frequently to notice-and-comment rulemaking, the election cycle
has rendered its initiatives less durable, thereby placing in jeopardy the
accomplishment of the majority's objective (that their appointee's policies
would be hardwired into the administrative apparatus and thereby withstand the
fortunes of the election cycle). This is because, as earlier discussed, guidance can
be reversed upon a change in agency leadership with relative ease, in contrast to
policies implemented through notice and comment, which can be reversed solely
by using that more arduous process once again, with judicial examination of the
new rationale.1
54
It is, in fact, telling that the greater speed of agency action that the
Democrats asserted in their brief to be the rationale for the agency's design is
not in the least related to reducing time consumed in the use of the regulatory
instrument. Rather, it is associated solely with the number of decisionmakers,
that is, the ability of one individual to act quickly, because the individual need
act solely to implement her own decision, and thus can avoid the ever-possible
"gridlock" generated by the need to reach a consensus, or at least a majority
decision, from among a group of bipartisan commissioners.
155
An apt and instructive analogue of how readily policies can be reversed
when decisions rest with one individual can be observed in the pattern of
rescission of executive orders, actions that can be characterized as a presidential
analogue to agency guidance. Upon assumption of office, presidents routinely
154. See supra note 32; Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insur. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (rejecting agency's rescission of safety standard for
inadequately explaining the decision). A further irony is Democrats' expression of frustration at their
inability to discipline the acting director's reversal of many of his predecessor's policies, incoherently
denying that the agency has the political independence that they were all too happy to provide when the
director was their nominee. See Ronald L. Rubin, Elizabeth Warren 's Sad Sick Joke, NAT'L REV. (Apr.
3, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/04/elizabeth-warren-attacks-mick-mulvaney-leadership-
cfpb/ [https://perma.cc/P87V-GV9B]; Elizabeth Warren, Republicans Remain Silent as Mulvaney's
CFPB Ducks Oversight, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/republicans-remain-
silent-as-mulvaneys-cfpb-ducks-oversight- 1522273696 [https://perma.cc/K5D4-MQLR]; Lydia
Wheeler, Mulvaney Fires Back after Warren Questions CFPB Leadership, THE HILL (Apr. 5, 2018),
http://thehill.com/regulation/administration/381789-mulvaney-fires-back-after-warren-questions-cfpb-
leadership [https://perma.cc/ED7P-EKP8].
155. Brief, supra note 148, at 16.
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reverse with a pen many of their predecessor's executive orders, not only those
concerning policies where their parties' positions dramatically diverge but also
subjects on which there is, in fact, bipartisan consensus.
15 6
As the history of executive order reversals indicates, when one individual
is at the helm, with few constraints, policy reversals can be, and are in fact,
executed rapidly. By contrast, in a multimember agency setting, where
commissioners have staggered terms, a new chair would need to obtain the
support of other commissioners, who might well have endorsed the earlier policy
when it was adopted, in order to alter its course. Lacking both the procedural
hurdle that renders policies adopted by notice and comment far more durable
than guidance and the multimember structure lending greater stability to
regulatory initiatives, the next CFPB director, with an appointment occurring in
a context of a unified Senate and presidency of the opposite political party to the
one that established the agency, will be able to reconfigure or reverse many of
the policy initiatives that were implemented over the CFPB's initial years. It
strains credulity to consider such a scenario to be remotely what legislators had
in mind when they designed the agency with its unusually independent structure.
The very insulation the majority provided to the agency ironically appears to
have inadvertently contributed to weakening the aim of the administrative
structure legislated for the CFPB: to adopt resilient regulation that would outlive
the initial director and turnover in the party controlling Congress and the
presidency.
Although a critical explanation for why an agency would avoid notice-and-
comment rulemaking, as described in the Appendix regarding automobile
financing, is the understanding that a particular policy could not legally be
successfully adopted through its use, individual incentives human nature as we
know it-surely also have a role to play. The behavior of the agency's initial
director, who resigned before the expiration of his term in order to seek a high
state political office, informs this conjecture. For an individual with political
ambition, the position of director of a highly visible government agency could
be an attractive vehicle for furthering a political career.
The interest of a director with political ambition could well be at odds with
that of the enacting legislators, despite sharing their overall objectives for the
agency, as a political reputation could be advanced by taking decisive, highly
visible action through guidance and related enforcement actions, of the kind
detailed in the Appendix. Such high-profile actions can garner media attention,
156. See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving
FederalRegulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1505-07 (2002)
(providing a history of executive orders, revised by each president, related to executive branch review of
agency rules using cost-benefit standard); Suzanne Malveaux, Sources: Obama May Use Executive Order
Reverse Abortion Policy, CNN POLITICS (Jan. 19, 2009),
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/01/19/sources-obama-may-use-executive-order-reverse-
abortion-policy/ [https:Hperma.cc/4V52-XQ3X] (summarizing a series of presidents reversing
predecessors' executive orders related to abortion policies).
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and important voting constituents might find them attractive, although they come
at the cost of less policy durability than regulating through the more cumbersome
rulemaking process. The enacting legislative majority, which, no doubt,
expected the implementation of durable policy that would advance its regulatory
agenda through its choice of agency structure, surely did not appreciate such a
possibility.
Whatever the Democratic Party leadership may have specifically thought it
was achieving when designing the CFPB, the incentive to avoid notice-and-
comment rulemaking provided by the agency's anomalous structure can best be
characterized as the kind of unintended consequence that often accompanies
legislation enacted in response to a crisis.157 In such a legislative context, when
urgency is considered to be of the essence for devising policy solutions, mistakes
are invariably made as it is impossible to think through with care the implications
of policy decisions, not least of which are choices related to institutional design.
As there has only been one director of the CFPB over the interval of
regulatory activity investigated in this Article, the finding that the agency was
significantly less likely to use notice-and-comment rulemaking compared to
other agencies is, of course, a function of that individual's preference. But it
suffices to say that there could not as readily have been a "Richard Cordray"
(i.e., one individual's) effect were the CFPB a more conventionally structured
agency. While the agency's acting director disassociated himself from his
predecessor's mode of governance and in fact opposed the agency's
organizational setup as a member of Congress, the issue is whether it is best
practice to retain an institutional design that demonstrably can adversely impact
the quality of regulatory decisionmaking, as well as its political legitimacy, due
to the vagaries of a single individual's preferences.
B. Regulatory Reform Proposals and the Agency Design Literature
The literature critiquing agencies' use of guidance to formulate policy
rather than following a notice-and-comment process has generated a veritable
cottage industry of reform proposals directed at altering agencies' incentives to
employ guidance compared to notice-and-comment rulemaking or at eliminating
the ability to choose between them entirely. A noncomprehensive list, to convey
a sense of the range of proposals, includes: requiring all significant policies to
be adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking; requiring agencies to
provide an explanation for their choice of an alternative instrument to notice and
comment, a decision that would be reviewable by a court; providing citizens with
the right to petition agencies to repeal or amend guidance, with the agency's
157. See Romano, supra note 83.
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response reviewable by a court; and requiring substantive judicial review of all
nonlegislative rules upon issuance.'5 8
Most of the proposals rely on an expanded scope of judicial review to deter
use of guidance in place of notice-and-comment rulemaking, and all of the
proposals share a perspective that is at odds with this Article's findings: they
contemplate operating across the board, in a one-size-fits-all type of approach,
whereas the Article's data suggest that more apt solutions would be more flexibly
focused on adapting the level of review to specific differences in agency design.
Moreover, such an approach, by identifying objective and easily identifiable
institutional criteria that courts could focus on for benchmarking an agency's
regulatory performance, would provide greater certainty regarding judicial
decisions, which is especially of value for business planning, in a doctrinal area
that is widely thought to be an intellectual morass.
For instance, courts, as a rule of thumb, should be more wary of regulatory
policies promulgated by an agency more insulated from political accountability,
such as an agency structured as the CFPB, compared to an agency subject o
greater congressional control, i.e., one with a more conventional organization.5 9
In the latter case, there is a greater likelihood that someone who is responsible to
the electorate is engaging in oversight and focused on the quality of
decisionmaking. Hence, at a minimum, the decision would be subject to greater
democratic legitimacy. In addition, in the multimember commission context,
courts should be attentive to a lack of consensus and should evaluate with care
the substance of dissents and the context in which they arise. As earlier
mentioned, dissents can provide valuable information regarding the quality of
agency decisionmaking. However, the information value may depend on the
decisional context, as when consensus is not an agency norm and commissioners
are repeatedly at war, dissents may be less informative signals of poorly
formulated policy.
These fact-based criteria for setting the level of judicial deference will, no
doubt, require judgment, but as they are simple procedural presumptions, the
approach would not tax judges' institutional competence or unduly burden them
when conducting a review. Still, even a more nuanced judicial review of agency
158. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidance,
Manuals, and the Like Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311
(1992) (arguing that all significant policies must be adopted through notice and comment, with an
exception for agency interpretations that do not add any substantive terms); Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness andLegitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461,
544 (2003) (proposing a "preference for notice-and-comment rulemaking for implementing broad
statutory requirements and interpreting ambiguous statutes unless [an agency] offer[s] an explanation for
their choice of [an alternative]," to which a "reviewing court should defer ... if reasonable"); Mendelson,
supra note 27, at 438-39 (proposing to require notice of guidance issuance and a right for citizens to
petition the agency to revise or repeal the guidance, with judicial review of agency response); Seidenfeld,
supra note 27 (proposing to subject all nonlegislative rules to substantive judicial review upon issuance).
159. Cf. TUCKER, supra note 92, at 357 (suggesting need for greaterjudicial review of
decisions of fully insulated agencies that fail to meet his design precepts for maintaining democratic
legitimacy and accountability).
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action that would vary in relation to the structural characteristics of agencies and
foster higher quality notice-and-comment rulemaking does not fully address the
problem of political accountability. As unelected officeholders with life tenure,
federal judges are not any more politically accountable than agency officials, and
they are arguably less so when contrasted with conventional independent
agencies that are subject to some degree of congressional oversight. However, at
the margin, judicial review can have a salutary effect on agencies if the inquiry
is thoughtfully structured.
Moreover, because agencies that are not subject to the appropriations
process but have focused, narrow technical missions, such as the Fed, do not
present as severe an accountability issue as does an agency with a broad
jurisdictional scope, such as the CFPB, courts would not need to apply the same
scrutiny to their regulatory activity, despite their equal political insulation. As
earlier noted, agencies' narrow and technical jurisdiction mitigates concern over
political accountability, as the realm of regulatory action is circumscribed, and a
court should be able to assess whether the action taken is reasonably within its
legislated authority, without extensive inquiry into the record.160 However,
additional scrutiny should apply were such an agency to take an unusual course
of action, at least in ordinary times, that has significant distributional
consequences. For, as Tucker contends, in seeking to identify criteria for
designing agencies that are fully independent of daily politics, such as central
banks, that would be consistent with democratic government, policies that have
large distributional consequences and tradeoffs are more appropriately set by
elected officials than by politically unaccountable regulators (or elected officials
should approve the specific exercise of such unconventional policies by the
agencies).
16 1
Several implications can further be drawn from the statistical analyses for
the literature on agency design. First, the findings support Gersen's critique of
McCubbins et al.'s thesis that by overlooking judicial deference to agency choice
of instrument, they misjudge the degree to which administrative structure and
process can function as a control mechanism, for this tool is effective only if
agencies consistently employ the notice-and-comment process. The CFPB has
been able to operate largely beyond Congress's purview and is thus a poster child
for an agency of the sort that McCubbins et al.'s thesis implies does not exist.
However, the agency could also be said to be the proverbial exception that proves
the rule, as the far greater frequency of use of notice-and-comment rulemaking
by the three other agencies with conventional structures whose activity is
analyzed in this Article is consonant with their operating implicitly under the
shadow of a meaningful level of congressional oversight and control. Of course,
it is not possible to conclude from the Article's analysis whether there ought to
be even greater use of notice-and-comment rulemaking than t present. While
160. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
161. See TUCKER, supra note 92, at 473-74, 558, 569.
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that is an important question warranting further inquiry, surely not all or the vast
majority of regulatory activity need be adopted by notice-and-comment
rulemaking, as the best approach could well be a function of the context. For
example, there is no compelling, a priori rationale to expect that the efficacious
regulatory response would be identical in substantive areas as disparate as tax,
health and safety, and financial regulation.
Second, the data support Datla and Revesz's contention that removal
protection should not be viewed as the sole or key defining characteristic of
agency independence. Agencies operating with the sole difference among the
Datla and Revesz independence criteria being the presence of statutory removal
protection the CPSC, CFTC, and SEC did not significantly differ in the
frequency of their use of the most politically accountable regulatory mechanism.
Were statutory removal protection itself a consequential factor with regard to an
agency's perception of its independence, then we would expect to have observed
a divergence in the use of regulatory instruments between the CPSC and the other
two agencies. Rather, consistent with Datla and Revesz's analysis, the data
suggest that removal protection matters only in conjunction with other design
characteristics, such as leadership structure or financing arrangement.
Third, the balance of findings provides support for skeptics of the
regulatory "ossification" thesis, whose advocates contend that the regulatory
process is broken or severely stressed ue to the requirements of notice-and-
comment rulemaking that impede agencies' ability to formulate effective and
timely regulation. The agency with the lowest volume of notice-and-comment
rulemaking (the CFPB) produced the second-highest volume of regulatory
activity, which would seem to be consistent with the ossification perspective that
notice-and-comment rulemaking takes an inordinate amount of agency cost and
time (as it could be said to indicate that by less frequent recourse to that
instrument, the agency was able to engage in a greater number of regulatory
actions). However, the three other agencies that implemented a significantly
higher proportion of activity through notice-and-comment rulemaking than the
CFPB still undertook a considerable amount of regulatory activity. In addition,
the direction of the difference in the level of overall activity between those
agencies and the CFPB is not consistent (that is, in two of the five possible
pairwise comparisons of agency activity between the CFPB and another agency,
the other agency has a higher level of activity than the CFPB).
More importantly, contrary to the ossification contention, there is not a
significant declining time trend in notice-and-comment rulemaking over the
period studied, nor is there a significant difference in its use across time for the
two agencies whose activity was tracked over two intervals separated by several
decades. Accordingly, consistent with other studies,162 these findings imply that
we would not appear to be suffering from an ossified regulatory process. Rather,
162. O'Connell, supra note 56; Yackee & Yackee, supra note 19.
Vol. 36, 2019
Does Agency Structure Affect Agency Decisionmaking?
use of the notice-and-comment apparatus would appear to present no serious
impediment to agencies for implementing regulation.
Finally, the empirical analysis suggests that there would be more value
added were administrative law scholarship to shift its attention away from
doctrinal debates over the constitutionality of the administrative state and the
rather court-centric view of the field, and toward addressing the evergreen master
institutional question: how do we mitigate the principal-agent problem that goes
to the heart of the governance of the administrative state?163 To put it in a
nutshell, the formalistic doctrinal claims display a simplistic understanding of
the federal bureaucracy as an undifferentiated entity (whether the perspective is
that the administrative state is unconstitutionally untethered from political
accountability or that it is operating constitutionally under the president's
thumb).164 Consequently, that literature cannot address the reality that is
underscored by this Article's data, that differences in agency governance
163. The constitutional discourse is exemplified by the polar normative positions staked
out by Hamburger and Vermeule. Compare PHILIP HAMBURGER, Is ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?
(2014) (criticizing the constitutionality of the administrative state), with Adrian Vermeule, No (Review of
Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?), 93 TEX. L. REV. 1547 (2015) (criticizing
Hamburger's conclusions), and ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW'S ABNEGATION (2016) (defending elements of
the administrative state).
164. Hamburger views the administrative state as illegitimate, informed by his reading
of constitutional history that citizens can only be bound by legislation enacted by Congress and the
president as set forth in the Constitution. HAMBURGER, supra note 163. In contrast, in joint work with
Posner, Vermeule advocates the practical efficacy and normative desirability of "unbound" executive
authority that is, of presidential power which is exercised administratively, that necessarily operates
without legal constraint and is checked from becoming despotic solely by public opinion and reelection.
ERIC R. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND (2011).
While Hamburger's objection that administrative action is not enacted by Congress and
the president, is, of course, formally true, it is quite often a distinction without a difference because
administrators are incentivized to adopt policies that match the preferences of the elected officials who
appoint them, and because Congress has the capacity to discipline wayward agencies whose rules do not
comport with its preferences. For instance, in accordance with the election cycle, agency activity shifts
without the need for new congressional majorities or presidents to enact legislation instructing agencies
regarding what o do. See B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of
the Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SC. REV. 801, 821 (1991) (explaining that agencies adjust policies when
new congressional majorities and presidents are elected). To the extent that Congress fails, on occasion,
to exercise adequate control, that is a political, not administrative law, failure, best addressed by elected
officeholders' reform of their institutions.
A difficulty for Posner and Vermeule's unbounded executive hypothesis is that the
president does not, in fact, have meaningful control over a good chunk of the administrative state, given
the numerosity, scale, and scope of independent agencies. Posner and Vermeule attempt to downplay the
significance of this institutional reality for their thesis by contending that in practice there is no difference
in presidential control of executive branch and independent agencies, because presidents appoint
commissioners who share their policy preferences and require independent and executive branch agencies
to coordinate their action. But this assertion fails upon examination: presidents have no means of
exercising ex post control over such commissioners, given their removal protection, in contrast to
Congress's control of the purse and oversight authority, and partisan balance requirements prevent
presidents from filling commissions solely with individuals sharing their policy preferences. In addition,
they provide no data indicating that the two types of agencies behave similarly either regarding rulemaking
or responsiveness to the president rather than Congress. In addition, casual empiricism suggests that the
regulatory activity of commissions is invariably carried out independently, without coordination with
executive branch agencies. For instance, none of the actions by the independent agencies analyzed in this
Article were taken in coordination with an executive branch agency according to the public record.
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arrangements can have significant consequences for the efficacy of
administrative decisionmaking and correlatively for its democratic legitimacy. A
takeaway from the Article's analysis should be that scholarly attention would
provide greater value were it to focus on the forms of agency organization and
decisionmaking, to evaluate which administrative structures are most effective
for obtaining higher quality and politically accountable decisions.
Conclusion
An extensive literature has debated the accountability of administrative
agencies and their relationship to Congress. A well-established strand in the
literature emphasizes that Congress retains control over agencies by their design
and, in particular, by the structure and process by which agency decisionmaking
is undertaken. This Article has examined the relationship between agency
structure and decisionmaking across four agencies with similar statutory
missions, the CFPB, with a uniquely independent structure, and the CFTC,
CPSC, and SEC, with a more conventional organizational design. It has
presented data consistent with the thesis that agency structure influences
regulatory strategy. Namely, the statistical analysis is in accordance with an
agency's insulation from Congress being related to its choice of regulatory
instrument, as the most independent agency in this study, the CFPB, uses
significantly less frequently the most publicly accountable regulatory instrument
of notice-and-comment rulemaking.
The findings do not imply that every time the CFPB uses an alternative
instrument it is acting strategically to evade legislative constraints, nor that the
three other agencies never engage in problematic regulatory decisions to avoid
scrutiny. Furthermore, no claim is made, let alone suggested, regarding an
optimal level of notice-and-comment rulemaking. Rather, the point is a far more
modest, nuanced one that, on the margin, the more insulated an agency, the less
likely it is to use the more politically accountable regulatory instrument, and
from the perspective of democratic accountability, informed by a principal-agent
framework between Congress and the administrative agencies it creates, that
should be a worrisome outcome.
The finding of the CFPB's significantly less frequent use of notice-and-
comment rulemaking is consistent with Gersen's insight that the canonical work
by McCubbins et al. has, at times, a flavor of a heroic understanding of the
effectiveness of Congress's oversight through the APA: such oversight works
effectively only if agencies actually use, where appropriate, the structure and
process that Congress has devised, and that is not always the case. But given the
correlative finding that multimember commissions subject to the appropriations
process do use notice-and-comment rulemaking quite regularly through time, the
Article's findings do conform with the overall gist of McCubbins et al.'s core
insight that agencies (those with such an organizational and funding structure)
would appear to operate in the shadow of a meaningful measure of congressional
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control. The level of the agencies' notice-and-comment activity further suggests
that the frequently expressed view that the process has led to the ossification of
the administrative state is not supported.
There is, at least, one "meta" policy implication from this study regarding
promoting more democratically accountable agencies. If Congress wishes
independent agencies with broad jurisdictional authority to follow notice-and-
comment rulemaking where practicable, then when designing such an agency,
Congress should rely on its long- and well-established agency structure, a
multimember commission, with partisan balance and subject to the
appropriations process, in preference to a structure akin to that of the CFPB. The
more conventional commission structure provides Congress with tools to
exercise oversight and hence to discipline a potentially wayward agency.
Reorganizing the CFPB along conventional independent agency lines would
therefore be a salutary step toward bringing the agency back within the
conventional understanding of democratic accountability animating the APA by
increasing the incentive to engage in the regulatory gold standard, notice-and-
comment rulemaking. Reconfiguring the CFPB's governance along the lines of
the Financial CHOICE Act that passed the House in 2017 (i.e., as an agency led
by a single director serving at the will of the president and subject to
congressional appropriations) would also render the agency more politically
accountable. That outcome, when viewed from the standpoint of democratic
legitimacy, would be beneficial, although this Article's data do not speak to the
decisionmaking of such an agency structure or the relative benefit of such an
arrangement compared to a multimember commission structure.
Appendix. Illustrations of the CFPB's Strategic Use of Guidance
The CFPB's statistically significant less frequent use of notice-and-
comment rulemaking than the other agencies under study in this Article does not,
of course, indicate whether the agency is using guidance to bypass the notice-
and-comment process and thereby avoid statutory strictures Congress placed on
rulemaking activity. But such behavior would be altogether consistent with such
an interpretation of the data. Nor would such a use indicate that the regulatory
outcome would, in fact, be different were a different regulatory instrument
employed. However, this Appendix provides three illustrations, publicized in the
business press, that evince the CFPB's strategic use of its administrative
authority through its choice of policy instruments, and that suggest that the
choice of instrument does, indeed, affect substantive outcomes.
A. Automobile Dealer Loans
One of the most notable examples of the CFPB's use of guidance where
rulemaking would conventionally be called for involves the regulation of
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automobile dealer loans. This CFPB activity has been the subject of
congressional investigations and internal documents revealed a deliberately
strategic, and what could reasonably be said to be lawless, use of guidance as a
regulatory strategy.165 In December 2017, the U.S. Government Accountability
Office, in response to a legislative inquiry, determined that the guidance was a
rule that should have been submitted to Congress for review under the
Congressional Review Act (CRA), which establishes an expedited legislative
process by which Congress can reverse an agency's rulemaking by passing a
joint disapproval resolution that is signed by the president.166 That determination
restarted the CRA's sixty-day clock for congressional action and in May 2018,
five years after its adoption, following the procedure outlined in the CRA, the
guidance was repealed.
167
The genesis of the guidance was the CFPB staff's belief that automobile
dealers charged higher interest rates to women and minorities (African-
Americans and Hispanic-Americans) than to white men. But they possessed no
actual sales data to support this belief, as the race and ethnicity of car buyers are
not recorded. The agency therefore employed a statistical analysis using proxies
for race and ethnicity, such as surnames and zip codes, to estimate discriminatory
dealer practices.168 Dodd-Frank, however, expressly prohibited the agency from
regulating automobile dealers.169  Accordingly, in order to circumvent
Congress's prohibition, the agency resorted to regulating "indirect auto lenders"
by issuing a fair lending guidance bulletin to banks which are subject to its
authority that indicated that the CFPB would enforce anti-discrimination laws
165. UNSAFE AT ANY BUREAUCRACY: CFPB JUNK SCIENCE AND INDIRECT AUTO
LENDING, H. FIN. SERV. COMM. REPUBLICAN STAFF REP., 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015) [hereinafter
HOUSE STAFF REP.].
166. Letter from Thomas H. Armstrong, General Counsel, GAO, to Senator Toomey,
B-329129 (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688763.pdf [https://perma.cc/C25Z-5VP9]; 5
U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2018).
167. Neil Haggerty, Trump Makes Repeal of CFPB Auto Lending Rule Official, AM.
BANKER (May 21, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/trump-makes-repeal-or-cfpb-auto-
lending-rule-official [https://perma.cc/X5Y4-WSCM].
168. Kim B. Perez, The CFPB "'Indirectly" Regulates Lending Through Auto-Dealers,
18 N.C. BANK. INST. 399, 418 (2014) (showing that the CFPB guidance bulletin relied on mathematical
proxies for race and ethnicity, using Social Security Administration and Census Bureau data to estimate
the probability someone is of a racial or ethnic minority based on their surname and geographic location,
and then used the proxies to determine where consumers might experience discrimination based on
interest rates that proxy-determined minorities received); Editorial, Your Car Dealer Must Be a Racist,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2013, at A14. The external consultant hired by the agency to assist in the analysis
was said to be a firm associated with the plaintiffs' bar and thus not a disinterested party with respect to
the methodology employed. See Ronald L. Rubin, The Rogue Regulator, WEEKLY STANDARD (Feb. 15,
2016), https://www.weeklystandard.com/ronald-l-rubin/the-rogue-regulator [https://perma.cc/ZK8M-
CEAJ]. Not surprisingly, the methodology employed produced much higher estimates of the number of
minorities receiving discriminatory loans than did statistical methods used by other experts, and indeed
was known by the agency to, in fact, grossly overstate the numbers. See id.; HOUSE STAFF REP., supra
note 165.
169. 12 U.S.C. § 5519 (2018). The statute contains exceptions to the exclusion of auto
dealers from the CFPB's regulatory authority, but none of the exceptions apply to the subject of the
guidance, namely auto loans that a dealer provides through a bank or that are securitized.
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against banks that purchased auto loans from auto dealers who discriminated. 170
As there was no evidence of intentional discrimination, the agency stated in the
bulletin that a disparate impact would be sufficient to find a violation.'
1
The guidance further strongly suggested that banks could avoid an
enforcement action if they imposed controls on and monitored dealer markups
and then took "prompt corrective action" against noncompliant dealers, or, better
yet, if they charged flat fees to eliminate dealer discretion in the setting of interest
rates. 172 The discretionary approach was the industry practice regarding dealer
compensation (lenders shared profits with dealers as a function of the dealer's
markup of a loan's interest rate). 17 3 Banks quite rationally responded to the
guidance, which was provided in the shadow of an implicit supervisory threat of
adverse regulatory action if they did not comply, by informing dealers that if
they did not comply, they would impose flat fees (which was the CFPB's
objective). 
174
The guidance bulletin contained a number of problematic legal
interpretations. For instance, the discrimination standard that the CFPB applied
in the bulletin was a disparate impact rather than disparate treatment (i.e., intent)
standard, a controversial position given Supreme Court jurisprudence at the time
requiring intent. 175 Equally, if not more, problematic was the CFPB's
interpretation in the bulletin of who is a "creditor" under the fair lending law.
Although the agency contended that it was not reinterpreting or making new
"law," in order to contend that there was no need for following rulemaking
procedures, the interpretation was quite novel, as neither auto dealers' markups
nor indirect lenders had previously been understood to fall within the statutory
definition. 176
170. CFPB BULL. 2013-02, INDIRECT AUTO LENDING AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE
EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT (2013). As the bulletin stated, it applied to "all indirect auto lenders
within the jurisdiction of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), including both depository
institutions and nonbank institutions."
171. Id.; CFPB to Hold Auto Lenders Accountable for Illegal Discriminatory Markup,
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Mar. 21, 2013),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-to-hold-auto-
lenders-accountable-for-illegal-discriminatory-markup/ [https://perma.cc/9U9B-PJKZ].
172. CFPB BULL. 2013-02, supra note 170, at 4 (conduct included in nonexclusive list
of "steps" institutions "may" take for "limiting fair lending risk in indirect auto lending").
173. Id. at 4-5.
174. Perez, supra note 168; Your Car Dealer Must Be a Racist, supra note 168. The
agency brought enforcement actions against four banks under the Bulletin. Perez, supra note 168, at 399
& 399 n.5.
175. Perez, supra note 168, at 424. As Perez notes, the statutes under which the
Supreme Court had upheld a disparate impact are those that contain the word "affect," language not
contained in the lending statute. Id. at 423. She further notes that the federal government's litigation
strategy at the time was generally to avoid taking disparate impact cases before the Supreme Court, such
that when the Court granted certiorari on a disparate impact challenge, the government would settle the
case to avoid a possible adverse decision. Id. at 424.
176. Id. at 413-14. The CFPB's claim regarding the lack of novelty was provided in
response to a query from members of Congress concerning why it had acted on the subject by issuing a
guidance rather than a rule. Id. at 412-13.
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More important than the guidance's apparent reliance on questionable legal
interpretations, internal documents indicated that the CFPB staff had discussed
adopting a rule to end dealer discretion regarding interest rates. They rejected
doing so, however, because they believed that they did not have the legal
authority to write such a rule, and that a rule would therefore be subject to
political repercussion or court challenge by automobile dealers. 177
A further reported concern of the CFPB staff was that the more transparent
rulemaking process would require it to "disclos[e] its proxy method used to
determine a disparate impact," exposing it to public comment and critique. 178 As
the staff was no doubt aware, federal courts require the disclosure of the data on
which a proposed rule relies under their interpretation of what constitutes a
"meaningful opportunity to participate in" rulemaking as required by the APA. 179
In short, a notice-and-comment process would have revealed, as internal
documents subsequently indicated, that the statistical method used was "prone
to significant error" and that known factors affecting interest rates not related to
race were not controlled for in the analysis, which when included, produced
dramatically different results.'80 While a notice-and-comment rulemaking might
therefore have produced a quite different substantive rule compared to the policy
177. As the staff put it, "There are several concerns with a rulemaking approach. First,
the legal authority for all of the potential rulemakings is unclear given our lack of authority over dealers.
Second, the Bureau would face considerable pressure from external groups if it sought to regulate or ban
the practice of markup itself .... The rule could be perceived as an attempt to circumvent our lack of
regulatory authority over auto dealers, and that presents both legal and political risks that our rule could
be overturned by a court or by Congress." CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR
THE DIRECTOR, AUTO FINANCE DISCRIMINATION INITIATIVE UPDATE MEETING 5 (Apr. 4, 2013),
https:Hfinancialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/april 3 2013 - briefing memorandum -
auto finance discrimination initiative update meeting.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9AD-7W9Z]
[hereinafter CFPB MEMO].
178. Rachel Witkowski, The Inside Story of the CFPBs Battle Over Auto Lending, AM.
BANKER (Sept. 24, 2015) (citing CFPB staff internal memo),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/the-inside-story-of-the-cfpbs-battle-over-auto-
lending-1076940-1 .html [https://perma.ccVP68-S3ZB]. The agency's internal documents acknowledged
that its methodology overestimated the number of African-Americans by 20 percent, while a private sector
report found a 41 percent overestimation, as the methodology estimated that 11 percent of an applicant
pool was African-American when the actual share was 7.8 percent. HOUSE STAFF REP., supra note 165,
at 29. Another report indicated that only half of the individuals identified by the agency's methodology
as African-Americans were actually African-Americans. Id. at 30. The director of the Bureau was
informed of the misestimation, and that a public document issued by the agency understated the error rate,
and he still permitted use of the flawed methodology to impose liability in enforcement actions against
banks, computing penalties based on incorrect numbers. Id.
179. MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 126, at 738.
180. HOUSE STAFF REP., supra note 165, at 3. As internal memoranda put it, "[W]e
have reason to believe that our proxy [methodology] is less accurate in identifying the race/ethnicity of
particular individuals than some proprietary proxy methods that use nonpublic data" and that there would
be "serious risk" that a "methods announcement [would] provid[e] fodder to defendants to show how our
methods are inferior to other proprietary proxies," and "[i]f we choose not to publish, we will be more
likely to consult an outside expert for litigation purposes and our internal methodological deliberations
will not be discoverable." Id. at 27 (quoting CFPB draft memorandum (emphasis added)). Moreover, the
Bureau director authorized enforcement actions despite having been informed that when the staff had
reestimated its models including standard controls (such as individual credit scores), disparities in interest
rates fell by half, information which was withheld in settlement negotiations. Id. at 38.
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contained in the guidance document, had the output of such a process replicated
the guidance on the same data revealed in the House investigation, a successful
court challenge would surely have followed.'8
Finally, the crux of the agency's objection was dealers' use of interest rate
markups. But the staff provided an additional, telling rationale for not pursuing
a rule to prohibit the practice: there was "little principled basis on which to
distinguish [automobile dealers'] markup from other, similar practices that are
ubiquitous in retail transactions."
' 182
Given the agency structure, the CFPB staff was able to outline the legal
difficulties that would arise in a notice-and-comment rulemaking to the bureau
director and plot out an alternative strategy without apprehension that the flawed
data and analysis flowing from it would be publicly revealed, thereby impeding
the agency's ability to proceed. Such a strategy would, however, have had a
much lower probability of success had the CFPB been a multimember entity.
That is because it is likely that a commissioner would have publicly objected to
such a guidance, given the diversity of perspective a partisan balance
requirement creates in a commission's membership, revealing the problematic
legal and statistical analysis supporting the action. Regulated entities would have
thereby been provided with information helpful for challenging any action the
agency might have brought against them for non-compliance. While banks might
still have settled such action, they would either have settled for far lower sums,
or have been better positioned to litigate successfully with reduced apprehension
of being subject to a supervisor's retaliation, given a commission's divided
opinion and the attendant publicity that would flow from a dissent.
The glimpse into the agency's internal deliberation afforded by Congress's
investigation (and in a few media reports prior to the congressional activity)
highlights the conflict between agency independence and accountability,
suggesting that the extensive political insulation of the CFPB facilitates its use
of guidance strategically to evade standards imposed by Congress. The balance
between these competing concerns has not been properly struck as neither the
public revelation of the agency's internal machinations nor Congress's
investigation had any impact on the CFPB's subsequent behavior. The guidance
remained in full force and effect for five years until the repeal by Congress under
the CRA. It is most probable that if, for instance, the CFPB had been subject to
the appropriations process, then the policy would not have lasted as long, as
181. Besides the difficulty of justifying the policy given the flawed data analysis, it
seems probable that the cost-benefit criteria would not have been easily satisfied as the dealer
compensation policy promoted by the guidance may well increase lending costs. As Perez notes, if dealer
discretion on rates is maintained, then banks must engage in costly monitoring, imposing costs that will
increase the rate of interest banks require, and if instead discretion is replaced with flat fees, then dealers
will lose the flexibility of trading interest rates off against purchase price, with the upshot that they will
be less likely to offer lower purchase prices. Perez, supra note 168, at 426-27.
182. CFPB MEMO, supra note 177, at 4.
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Congress would have disciplined the agency early on by adopting an
appropriations rider prohibiting use of funds to enforce the policy.1
8 3
B. Credit Card Add-ons
The CFPB's use of guidance to regulate credit card add-ons provides an
additional illustration of how the agency's policymaking sidesteps congressional
instructions regarding its rulemaking considerations. The CFPB staff believed
that credit card add-ons, such as payment for lost wallet protection, had little or
no value and should not be sold.184 Rather than engage in notice-and-comment
rulemaking to determine whether that was in fact the situation, the agency
published guidance, a list of "expectations" regarding what it would look for in
evaluating the products banks offered, and then brought three enforcement
actions against credit-card providers for improper marketing in light of those
expectations. 185
In response to those agency actions, the three largest banks, followed by
other institutions (none of whom were the subject of the enforcement actions),
"voluntarily" cancelled the products.186 Withdrawal of the products, was, no
doubt, the agency's objective from the outset. Yet such action would contravene
the CFPB's statutory directive, which, instructs the agency to consider the
"potential benefits and costs to consumers and covered persons [financial
institutions], including the potential reduction of access by consumers to
consumer financial products or services resulting from such rule."'18 7 Drafting a
guidance setting forth a set of "expectations" with which it was not possible to
183. Such action would likely to have been taken because in November 2015, a
bipartisan bill passed the House that would have revoked the indirect auto financing guidance and required
the agency to use a notice-and-comment procedure for any future regulation of the subject. See John Irwin,
U.S. House Passes Bill Revoking CFPB Auto Lending Guidance, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Nov. 18, 2015),
https://www.autonews.com/article/20151118/FINANCE AND INSURANCE/ 151119809/u.s.-house-
passes-bill-revoking-cfpb-auto-lending-guidance [https://perma.cc/TQK9-ZRQ2]. President Obama
indicated that he would veto the legislation, and it did not move forward in the Senate.
184. Although the agency's objections to the products were stated in terms of the use
of"deceptive" or "high-pressure" marketing tactics, WhatAre Credit CardAdd-on Products?, CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Mar. 1, 2013), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-are-credit-card-
add-on-products-en-1541/ [https://perma.cc/TPM4-X9WIU], the detailed procedures it identified for
banks' marketing of such products to not be considered deceptive were so burdensome that it is plain that
the agency's true goal was to eliminate the products entirely, an objective that was achieved. By 2016, the
agency eliminated the term "deceptive" from its website.
185. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUR., MARKETING OF CREDIT CARD ADD-ON PRODUCTS
(2012),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207 cfpb bulletin marketing of credit card addon products.p
df [https:Hperma.cc/KL6M-JML7]; Karen Weise, The Consumer Finance Watchdog Is Having an Impact,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 10, 2013) (noting enforcement actions and discussing guidance),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-01 -10/the-consumer-finance-watchdog-is-having-an-
impact. The three banks subject to the enforcement actions one of which was for failure to supervise a
third-party vendor and not for any failures in its own marketing were required to pay in aggregate $101.5
million in fines and $435 million in refunds to customers. Id.
186. Weise, supra note 185.
187. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(A)(i) (2018).
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comply enabled the agency to avoid having to consider and justify the potential
reduction in consumer access to the product as Congress directed in Dodd-Frank,
which could have been difficult to do in a notice-and-comment rulemaking.
C. Mortgage Marketing Services Agreements
A third illustration of the CFPB's choice of regulatory instrument as a
mechanism to evade Congress's rulemaking constraints involves its regulatory
approach to marketing services agreements in real estate transactions. The Real
Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (RESPA), one of the statutes whose
enforcement was transferred to the CFPB in Dodd-Frank, prohibits giving or
accepting a fee or kickback for referrals of real estate settlement services
involving a federally related mortgage loan.188 But fees paid by lenders to real
estate entities for marketing services actually rendered, such as advertising or
promotional services, at fair market value, are legitimate payments and not
prohibited by the statute. 189 Marketing services agreements are ubiquitous in real
estate transactions, having been used for decades. The CFPB staff, however,
apparently perceived all such arrangements as disguised payments for referrals
(i.e., illegal notwithstanding the statute) and as providing no benefits to
consumers but, rather, as harming them by limiting competition.
In October 2015, following a "warning" issued regarding its view of the
legality of marketing services agreements a few months earlier in July, the CFPB
issued a compliance bulletin addressing the agreements in relation to RESPA,
indicating its "grave concerns" over their use, emphasizing the "legal and
compliance risks" that they presented to mortgage industry participants and
stating that it would "continue actively scrutinizing" the use of such
agreements.190 The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) characterized the
guidance as directed at eliminating marketing services agreements, legal or not,
from the marketplace, providing the following perspective on the guidance to its
members: "Coming as it does after enforcement and other actions by the CFPB
on marketing services agreements, MBA believes that the (CFPB's) bulletin is
short on actual guidance, and can only be interpreted as a series of warnings to
lenders against MSAs."'191 The MBA further noted that the bulletin "diverge[d]
188. 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (a) (2018).
189. 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (c) (2018).
190. CFPB COMPLIANCE BULL. 2015-05, RESPA COMPLIANCE AND MARKETING
SERVICES AGREEMENT 5 (Oct. 8, 2015); Trey Garrison, CFPB Doubles Down against Marketing Services
Agreements, HOUSINGWIRE (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/35303-cfpb-doubles-
down-against-marketing-services-agreements [https:Hperma.cc/JP6D-ACK8].
191. Ben Lane, MBA Issues Warning: CFPB Is Coming for Marketing Services
Agreements, HOUSINGWIRE (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/35343-mba-issues-
warning-cfpb-is-coming-for-marketing-services-agreements [https://perma.cc/ZDN2-ENGH].
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from previous interpretations" of RESPA, and "notably" lacked "any guidance
on how to properly construct a [mortgage servicing agreement].'9 2
The agency could not be clearer in conveying its view that lenders
entities subject to its jurisdiction should not enter into marketing services
agreements. In fact, two large mortgage lenders, Wells Fargo and Prospect
Mortgage, had already responded to the not so veiled threat upon issuance of the
"warning" and exited all such agreements because of "regulatory uncertainty"
generated by the CFPB's actions, including its reinterpretation of RESPA.
193
Upon the bulletin's release, Bank of America soon followed suit and announced
it was discontinuing use of the arrangements as well.
194
The agency's approach to these contractual arrangements parallels its
approach toward credit card add-ons: rather than engage in notice-and-comment
rulemaking, it issues guidance with which firms will find it daunting, if not
impossible, to comply, albeit in this instance using vagueness with regard to the
acceptable standard of conduct rather than stringency of acceptable terms. The
agency's reinterpretation of RESPA (disregarding the statutory safe harbor for
payment in compensation for nonreferral services rendered) could have been
undertaken by notice-and-comment rulemaking, but that was what the agency
apparently sought to avoid, for as the MBA noted, the rulemaking context would




192. Id. The CFPB had been reinterpreting the statute in enforcement actions brought
before the guidance was itself issued, and the validity of the reinterpretation, as well as its retroactive
application to contracts written under the prior interpretation, were issues raised in litigation in which a
federal appellate court held the agency's structure to be unconstitutional, as well as invalidating the new
interpretation of the rule. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016). On
rehearing by the full Court of Appeals, the panel's unconstitutionality holding was reversed, but its rulings
striking down the agency's statutory interpretation and retroactive application were reinstated as the
decision of the court. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
193. Trey Garrison, CFPB to Mortgage Industry: Get Out of MSAs, HOUSINGWIRE
(July 30, 2015) https://www.housingwire.com/articles/34641-cfpb-to-mortgage-industry-get-out-of-msas
[https://perma.cc/9QSJ-T3L4]. They left the market in response to the agency's July "warning." Id.
194. Ben Lane, CFPB, Regulatory Concerns Drive Bank of American Out of MSAs,
HOUSINGWIRE (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/35351-cfpb-regulatory-concers-
drive-bank-of-america-out-of-msas [https:Hperma.cc/4QQJ-WD38].
195. Lane, supra note 191.
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Notes: This table tallies the form of regulatory activity undertaken by four
federal agencies, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC), and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
Agency activity is tracked from April 2011 (first action by the newly established
CFPB) through May 2016 for the first three and fifth columns; the fourth column,
CPSC initial, tracks activity from June 1973 (first action by the then-newly
established CPSC) through July 1978, matching the number of months in which
the CFPB's initial activity is tracked, and the sixth column, CFTC initial, tracks
activity from April 1975 (first action taken by the then newly-established CFTC)
through May 1980, matching the number of months in which the CFPB's initial
activity is tracked. Activity tallied excludes enforcement actions, decisions on
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petitions, issuance of advisory opinions, no-action letters, and guidance directed
to consumers. "n.a." indicates a type of activity that is not applicable to an
agency. A number in parentheses indicates the number of actions in the non-
notice-and-comment rule or guidance category that were effective on publication
with solicited comments to follow the effective (i.e., publication) date, except
for futures contracts, for which the CFTC solicited comments before it
determined to approve a proposed contract, the action tallied being notices of
proposed contracts and not final approvals (which were not included in the
Federal Register). Fifteen CFPB interim rules are transfers of regulation from
other agencies, and four CPSC initial notice-and-comment exempt rules are
transfers of regulation from other agencies. The CPSC direct final rule count
includes one rule that was withdrawn due to receipt of adverse comments.
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Table 2. Significant Agency Policymaking Activities Overview
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Notes: This table tallies the form of regulatory activity, eliminating
nonsubstantive activity, undertaken by four federal agencies, the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), and Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC). Agency activity in the first three and fifth
columns is tracked from April 2011 (first action by the newly established CFPB)
through May 2016; the fourth column, CPSC initial, tracks activity from June
1973 (first action by then newly established CPSC) through July 1978, matching
the number of months in which the CFPB's initial activity was tracked, and the
sixth column, CFTC initial, tracks activity from April 1975 (first action taken
by the then newly-established CFTC) through May 1980, matching the number
of months in which the CFPB's initial activity is tracked. Activity tallied
excludes enforcement actions; petitions; advisory opinions; no-action letters and
consumer guidance; rules that are not substantive in content, such as technical
corrections, technical amendments, and extensions of effective or compliance
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dates; and rules related to internal organization or procedure. Detail on the
excluded material is provided in Appendix Table Al. "n.a." indicates a type of
activity that is not applicable to an agency. A number in parentheses indicates
the number of actions in the non-notice-and-comment rule or guidance category
that were effective on publication with solicited comments to follow the action's
effective (i.e., publication) date, except for futures contracts, for which the CFTC
solicited comments before it determined to approve a proposed contract, the
action tallied being notices of proposed contracts and not final approvals (which
were not included in the Federal Register). Fifteen CFPB interim rules are
transfers of regulation from other agencies, and four CPSC notice-and-comment
exempt rules are transfers of regulation from other agencies. The CPSC direct
final rule count includes one rule that was withdrawn due to adverse comments.
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Table 3. Agency Regulatory Activity over Time and in Relation to Dodd-Frank
Requirements
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Notes: This table tallies the form of regulatory activity, eliminating
nonsubstantive activity, undertaken by four federal agencies, the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), and Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) over time. Years 1-6 for the CFPB, CFTC, CPSC,
and SEC are April 2011 (first action by the newly established CFPB) through
May 2016; for CPSC initial, June 1973 (first action by then newly established
CPSC) through July 1978; and for CFTC initial, April 1975 through May 1980
(first action by then newly established CFTC), matching the number of months
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in which the CFPB's initial activity was tracked. Numbers in parentheses
indicate the number of the respective regulatory action taken in conjunction with
a provision of Dodd-Frank. CFTC futures contract proposals are included in the
"all other rules" category, while CFTC statutory-required notice-and-comment
exchange rules are included in the "notice-and-comment" category. Activity
tallied excludes enforcement actions; petitions; advisory opinions; no-action
letters and consumer guidance; rules that are not substantive in content, such as
technical corrections, technical amendments, and extensions of effective or
compliance dates; and rules related to internal organization or procedure. Detail
on the excluded material is provided in Appendix Table A. 1.
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Table 4. Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Crosstabulations.
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Notes: This table presents contingency table chi-squared tests
crosstabulating an indicator variable for notice-and-comment rules against either
agency or year. The agencies are Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB),
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC), and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
tracked over approximately six years. The time period is April 2011 (first action
by the newly established CFPB) through May 2016; activity by the CPSC and
CFTC is also tracked from June 1973 and April 1975, respectively (first action
by the agencies when established) through July 1978 and May 1980,
respectively; when only this period is used for these agencies' observations, it is
referred to as "initial period." When "both times" appears in the table, all CPSC
and CFTC observations are included in the crosstabulation. Numbers in
parentheses in column 2 are the chi-square degrees of freedom; numbers in
parentheses in column 4 are the number of observations in the crosstabulation.
The reported probabilities are not adjusted for multiple comparisons.
* indicates a chi-squared value that is significant when applying a
Bonferroni adjustment, i.e., for nineteen comparisons, to retain a global
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confidence interval of 95 percent (.05 significance), the probability is adjusted
to .0026, which, interpolating from chi-squared distribution tables reporting
probability values of .002 and .005, is a chi-squared value of 18.4526.
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,2069 2623 3212 2333 .2632 -9769
(2630) (3133) (3500) (2671) (3465) (4476)*
.2865 -2669 - 3949 .;72 .2659 -7106
(.2920) (3882) .,4410) _ (.2940) (.4314) (.5266) *
6609 .0918 .3467 6605 .0925 -.4743
(2573) (3601) (42Of) (2580)* (3812) (5574)
1797 -076 -_2678 2084 -0866 -7172
(3268) (4513) (5436) (.3294) (4865) (6593) *
-1 168 -.e180 28,8026
(.7756) (2,7217) (5.2197) *
-6528 -.5943 -1.3010 -.5363 -.5899 -97856
9)** (259)* (3576)** (2133) (7319) (1 5980)*
6I ,97 6050* 67159** 62 42 ** 6OS ** 7997*
,0711 1127 .1662 .0731 . 127 M23
62 57% 66,59% 7044% 63.89% 6659% 73.20%
464 45,79 4787 0802 ** 8962 ** 43J8*
684 419 362 684 419 362
Notes: This table presents the results of logistic regressions of agency
activity, where the dependent variable equals 1 if the activity is a notice-and-
comment rule, 0 for all other rules and guidance activity. Agencies are Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC). Activity is tracked from April 2011 (first action
by the newly established CFPB) through May 2016; activity by the CFTC and
CPSC is also tracked from April 1975 and June 1973, respectively (first action
by the then newly established CFTC and CPSC) through May 1980 and July
1978, respectively. Model 1 uses observations of all agencies over both time
periods; model 2 uses observations for only 2011-2016, excluding observations
of the activity of the CFTC and CPSC in 1975-80 and 1973-78, respectively;
model 3 uses observations only for agencies subject to Dodd-Frank (CFPB,
CFTC and SEC), excluding all activity of the CPSC and CFTC activity in 1975-
80. CFPB indicator variable equals I if the agency is the CFPB, 0 otherwise;
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Dodd-Frank indicator variable equals 1 if the activity was undertaken under a
provision in Dodd-Frank; year 2 through year 6 dummies are dummy variables
for the year in which the action was taken in event time (that is, the first year of
activity for an agency, for example, 2011, 1973 and 1975, are all treated as year
1, and so forth), where year 1 is the omitted dummy variable; resources per capita
is the agency's budget in millions divided by the number of employees, where
for the CFPB the budget is the amount of funds transferred from the Federal
Reserve and for the other agencies it is the amount appropriated by Congress.
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors; ** significant at < .01; *
significant at < .05. Likelihood ratio chi-squared statistic tests the null hypothesis
that all coefficients except that of the constant term are zero; Pearson chi-squared
(goodness of fit) statistic tests observed against expected outcomes.
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Table 6. Dodd-Frank Mandated Rulemakings with Deadlines
CFP'B CFTC S EC
Dodd-Frank pr6o is requirmg Aopuon ofa ru I ith a deadIine t669
odd -F pr r ioz i3 r n a rdcv ith a dcadIi for wiuc h he has not y c (0) 3 (3) 15 (8)
bei f actio ( tr o c roioinsi b for which 2 nl h-bce propo-d)
Numbe ofrules Thopted rdatd wa eadnice 24 33 35
Number ofnies adopted related to a dad line andt xctudhe_ mulliplc nuc added 8 Is 25
kinder a iglec Dodd--FIrank prowit ih number tha arc first mic adoptcd irndcr a
Numbr ofN&C Tui g wcid to a adlin prte S .on 2 31 a
Numbr of Intoer mule roavd to a iendlme pTavksioa 2 i r
Numbes wh1r nob-N&' 6 cs c ent n ta r ic to a dea leie poSviCou ( 3e(2)
to numbe of h Voiificat r ecou
Nubor t uiLnce doisiot relqied t a derdline pvison I t a
Numb ao ute d o a Vcrle env slor adoptc o th f hsample cto n of3) 6(6)
those, rnbr tht are first rule adopted u or an prio iin n)
Notes: The data source for identification of Dodd-Frank provisions
requiring rules subject to deadlines, and of the rules adopted under those
provisions, is the Davis Polk Regulatory Tracker. The Tracker, and hence the
table, count each subsection of a provision in Dodd-Frank with a deadline as a
separate requirement, i.e., section 619 (the Volcker Rule) accounts for seven
required rulemakings with a deadline for the SEC. A rule adopted by an agency
may relate to multiple provisions identified in the Tracker as requiring rules with
deadlines but is counted only as one rule in the table, i.e., one SEC rule is related
to all seven of the Volcker rule entries. An agency may also adopt multiple rules
for a single provision requiring a rule with a deadline, i.e., there are two SEC
rules adopted for each Volcker rule entry. With the exception of row 4, which
counts only the first rule adopted for any provision, the counts in the table include
all rules related to a provision. "N&C" stands for a rule adopted using notice and
comment; "n.a." for not applicable. The sample period is from April 2011 (the
first regulatory action taken by the CFPB) to May 2016; all SEC rules adopted
outside of the sample were issued before April 2011, while two of the out-of-
sample CFTC rules were issued after May 2016.
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Table Al. Construction of Table 2 from Table 1 (Detail of Insignificant
Agency Activity)
108 130 5 143 113 t65 717
10 7 3 37 22 18 97
24 11 0 9 1 2 47
1 I5 4 3 2 2 27
0 13 0 0 6 18 37
a. 21 Ma na. n~a. ma, 21
1 4 a n.a 2 1 8
12 59 Si 94 80 124 480
124 14 9 27 92 33 399
40 60 0 0 32 3 135
8 n n~a. n.a. n.a. na 8
15 n.a. n.a. naa. n.a. na I
0 0 0 1 0 5 6
na. 24 n.a. Ma noa n.a. 24
"a, na, 3 rA Mal 4 7
61 30 6 26 60 21 204
Notes: This table presents information on the nonsubstantive regulatory
activity undertaken by four federal agencies, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB), U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Consumer
Product Safety Commission, and Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC). Agency activity in the first three and fifth columns is tracked from April
2011 (first action by the newly established CFPB) through May 2016; the fourth
column, CPSC initial, tracks activity from June 1973 (first action by then newly
established CPSC) through July 1978, matching the number of months in which
the CFPB's initial activity was tracked and the sixth column, CFTC initial,
tracks activity from April 1975 (first action taken by the then newly-established
CFTC) through May 1980, matching the number of months in which the CFPB's
initial activity is tracked.. The tallies show the action by regulatory type that are
excluded from Table 1 to construct Table 2 (significant agency activity). "n.a."
indicates a type of activity that is not applicable to an agency. Technical
corrections consist of corrections in spelling, punctuation, citations and cross-
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references. An example of a technical amendment is a rule adjusting asset size
exemption thresholds (e.g., 21 CFPB rules); a few technical amendments are
technical corrections to rule amendments. Two notice-and-comment rules are
eliminated from Table 1, one CFTC rule in its initial years of operation and one
CFPB rule, because they pertained to nonsubstantive matters, respectively,
internal procedure and extension of an effective date. The rule in the "other"
category for the CFPB was an interim rule addressing how states were to provide
notice a to the CFPB warning it of actions or proceedings they were taking, and
was characterized as insignificant because it had no bearing on private
parties/regulated entities; the two rules in the "other" category for the CFTC
consist of a rule identifying an entity designated to provide swap dealer id
numbers and a rule eliminating references to entities eliminated under Dodd-
Frank, and the "other" category rule for CFTC initial concerns document
privacy; the four rules in the "other" category for the SEC consist of a rule
noticing a temporary rule's expiration, a rule noticing the effective date of a rule
that had been held in abeyance due to litigation, an interim final temporary rule
that maintained the status quo to delay the effectiveness of a change made by
Dodd-Frank until a notice-and-comment rule could be adopted, and an order
indicating an inflation adjustment required by Dodd-Frank entered simultaneous
with a notice of a notice-and-comment rule-making for how to calculate future
inflation adjustments. The guidance in the "other" category for the CPSC
concerns postponement of the effective date of a policy and procedures statement
concerning substantial product hazards, and for the CFTC concerns advisory
committee creation and release of reports; record system guidance includes
annual privacy reports.
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Table A2. Agency Resources
____CFP CFTC CPSC SEC CFTC (initi CPSC- itlf
2011 Employees 663 697 543 3853
Budget $162 $202 675 $115 018 $1185 _
2012 Employees 970 702 525 4058
Budxei $343 $205294 $114,5 $1321
2013 Employees 1335 666 523 4221
5Budget $18 $205,294 $114 5 $1321 _ ]
2014 e 143 688 532 4341
Budget $534 $215 $118 $1350
2015 Employees 1529 747 549 4578
Budget $485 _$250 $123 $1500
2016 Employees 1648 716 567 4721
Budge $565 $250 $125 $165
1973 Employees _ 424
5Budget $215
1974 Employees 974
___Budget _______ ______ 30.9
1975 Eployees 357 1067
Budget i4 168 $369.54
1976 Employees _435 930
1Budget S___ ____$11 .483 $3956o4
1977 Employees 460 968
Budget $13,085 $39,759
1978 Employees 470 996
Budget $13 95 $40,461
1979 Employees 477
___Budget S____________ 15,836 ______
190Eployees ____ _______ 462 '_____
______ Budget __________ ___________ _______ $ 661? 7____________
Notes: This table presents the number of employees and budget (in
millions) for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC), and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), averaged over
the six years 2011-16, and for the CFTC and CPSC over 1975-80 and 1973-78,
respectively, in the columns identified in parentheses as "initial". Sources: U.S.
Office of Personnel Management, Federal Human Resources Data, available at
https://www.fedscope.opm.gov; CFPB annual financial reports for fiscal years
2011-2016, available at "Financial Reports," CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/budget-strategy/financial-reports/
[https://perma.ccYH83-VS5S]; omnibus budget reconciliation bills enacted by
Congress for fiscal years 2011-2016, available at https://www.congress.gov, and
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, APPENDIX, for fiscal years 1975-82.
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Figure 3d
Figure 3d. CPSC Initial Regulatory
Activity over Time
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Figure 3h
Figure 3h. Four Agencies' N&C Activity
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Figure 3i
Figure 3i. Four Agencies N&C Activity
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